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POLITICAL THICKETS AND CRAZY QUILTS: 
REAPPORTIONMENT AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
Robert B. McKay* 
IF asked to identify the two most important cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in the twentieth cen-
tury, informed observers would be likely to name, in whichever 
order, Brown v. Board of Education1 and Baker v. Carr.2 Both 
foretold the reordering of fundamental concepts of social or po-
litical life in large sectors of the nation, Brown with its condem-
nation of state-sanctioned segregation, and Baker with its invita-
tion to judicial invalidation of state legislative apportionment 
districts. In another sense both cases are curious choices for so 
high a ranking. Neither decision required any litigant before 
the Court or any other person to adopt or refrain from any spe-
cific course of action. In both instances the Court opened up the 
question before it for extended debate in the forum of state and 
lower federal courts and for the public discussion that inevitably 
followed. But only the willfully blind could fail to see in Brown 
that segregation in public life was thenceforth doomed, however 
quickly or slowly might come its demise. Similarly, in Baker, 
even though the Court scarcely hinted whether the allegations of 
the complaint in that case stated a violation of constitutional rights, 
it would be a bold prognosticator indeed who would find in the 
decision no more than a jurisdictional rule. 
The public readily grasped the wider implications of both 
cases. The import of Brown was so immediately apparent that in 
the areas most deeply committed to segregation as a way of life 
the decision day, Monday, May 17, 1954, was immediately dubbed 
as "Black Monday," and only gradually was there a noticeable 
shift from that attitude to reluctant acceptance, at least in many 
parts of the South. The reaction to Baker, however, was quite 
different. Instead of resistance or at best begrudging acceptance 
of a clearly stated principle, as had been the case with Brown, 
the apportionment decision induced an immediate, widespread, 
indeed eager, rush toward legislative and judicial implementation 
of a principle that may have been implicit, but was certainly not 
• Professor of Law, New York University.-Ed. 
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
[ 645] 
646 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
articulated. Before the end of 1962 at least a dozen legislatures 
had met in regular or special session to propose constitutional 
change where necessary and to enact statutory modification where 
permissible within the local framework; more than sixty lawsuits 
had been initiated in state and federal courts challenging existing 
apportionment formulas in at least thirty-five states; and public 
acceptance of the decision continued on the whole to be enthu-
siastic.3 Near the end of 1962, doubts began to be expressed 
about the wisdom, propriety, and technical competence of the 
decision in Baker, a development which might have been antici-
pated in the light of similar experience following Brown.4 The 
voice of the "yes-but" critics began to be heard throughout the 
land.5 Apart from the niggling negativism of a few, the criticisms 
that have been expressed are seriously and earnestly advanced and 
deserve rejoinder in that spirit. An attempt will here be made 
to formulate an answer. To explain why the stated fears seem 
to this writer in part exaggerated and in part groundless, it is 
necessary to review briefly what Baker v. Carr was-and what it 
was not. 
I. BAKER v. CARR: THE NARROW HOLDING 
The Tennessee constitution has required, since 1870, that 
the number of representatives and the number of senators in the 
two houses of the General Assembly shall each "be apportioned 
3 For a more detailed analysis of these developments, state by state, see Appendix infra. 
4 The Brown decision was protested not only by those who disapproved of the result, 
but was criticized as well even by some opponents of segregation who feared usurpation 
of its proper role by the Court. Two aspects of the "friendly" criticism deserve notice: 
(1) The earliest reaction was from some who found in the decision merely judicial accept• 
ance of data from social psychologists and other social scientists as to the harms of 
segregation without sanction in the Constitution. For an example of the claims of the 
social scientists that led to these charges, see Clark, Desegregation: An Appraisal of the 
Evidence, 9 SocIAL IssuES No. 4, at 3 (1953). Reply was not long in coming. For the best 
answer, see Cahn, Jurisprudence, 1954 ANNUAL SURVEY AM. L. 809 (1955), and 1955 id. 
655 (1956). (2) Several years later a different kind of challenge was made on the ground 
that the Court had failed, in Brown and elsewhere, to articulate "neutral principles that 
satisfy the mind." Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAR.v. 
L. R.Ev. 1, 29 (1959). Again appropriate answers were soon made. See, e.g., Pollak, Racial 
Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 
1 (1959); Black, The Lawfulness of the School Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 
(1960). Professor Black stated the matter with commendable simplicity: "What the four-
teenth amendment, in its historical setting, must be read to say is that the Negro is to 
enjoy equal protection of the laws, and that the fact of his being a Negro is not to be 
taken to be a good reason for denying him this equality, however 'reasonable' that might 
seem to some people. All possible arguments, however convincing, for discriminating 
against the Negro, were finally rejected by the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 423. 
IS By the end of 1962 at least the following nay-sayers and narrow constructionists, 
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among the several counties or districts, according to the number 
of qualified electors in each .... " 6 Thus, as the Court stated, 
"Tennessee's standard for allocating legislative representation 
among her counties is the total number of qualified voters resi-
dent in the respective counties, subject only to minor qualifica-
tions."7 
Between 1901 and 1961, however, despite a requirement for 
decennial reapportionment in accordance with the required pop-
ulation standard,8 the legislature had taken no action. Moreover, 
the complaint in Baker alleged that the 1901 statute itself failed 
to conform to the state constitutional mandate, "but instead arbi-
trarily and capriciously apportioned representatives in the Senate 
and House without reference . . . to any logical or reasonable 
formula whatever."9 Meanwhile, the number of persons eligible 
to vote more than quadrupled, while there was at the same time 
a substantial shift in the centers of population, particularly from 
rural to urban areas. And so it was "primarily the continued 
application of the 1901 Apportionment Act to this shifted and 
enlarged voting population" that gave rise to the controversy.10 
The action was brought under sections 1983 and 1988 of 42 
U.S.C. to redress alleged deprivation of federal constitutional 
rights, specifically claiming that plaintiffs, as eligible voters in 
urban areas, had been denied the equal protection of the laws "by 
virtue of the debasement of their votes.''11 This ultimate question 
of substance was not decided. Instead, as Mr. Justice Brennan 
summarized the opinion which he wrote for the majority, the 
holding was narrow: 
"In light of the District Court's treatment of the case we 
hold today only (a) that the court possessed jurisdiction of 
sophisticated critics all, had expressed their reservations about the substance or the 
technique of the decision in Baker. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 
YALE L.J. 39 (1962); Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Inter-
vention and Its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 673 (1962); 
McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54 (1962); Neal, 
Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUPRE!l!E COURT REv. 252. The 
carefully-wrought contribution of Professor Lucas in this symposium issue should also 
be included in this category: Legislative Reapportionment and Representative Govern-
ment: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MzcH. L. REv. 711 (1963). 
6 TENN. CoNsr. art. II, §§ 5, 6. In the house of representatives it is further provided 
that the number "shall never exceed ninety-nine" (§ 5), while in the senate the number 
"shall not exceed one-third the number of representatives" (§ 6). 
7 369 U.S. at 189. 
8 TENN. CoNsr. art. II, § 4. 
9 369 U.S. at 192. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Id. at 188. 
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the subject matter; (b) that a justiciable cause of action is 
stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appro-
priate relief; and (c) because appellees raise the issue before 
this Court, that the appellants have standing to challenge 
the Tennessee apportionment statutes. Beyond noting that 
we have no cause at this stage to doubt the District Court 
will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional 
rights are found, it is improper now to consider what remedy 
would be most appropriate if appellants prevail at the trial."12 
Despite the Court's careful-and proper-limitation of the 
reach of its decision, the reader of the opinion is scarcely required 
to suspend belief that there is more. To suggest that a majority 
of the Court found no fault with the Tennessee apportionment 
structure would strain credulity. There were arguably two con-
stitutional defects in the Tennessee scheme: (1) There was a 
severe imbalance between qualified electors and representation in 
both houses of the General Assembly;13 and (2) even apart from 
population disparities, the Tennessee apportionment was, in the 
words of Mr. Justice Clark, "a crazy quilt without rational basis."H 
That the two issues may raise problems of differing seriousness is 
foretold by the fact that Mr. Justice Clark suggested that in his 
view even substantial disparity of population among voting dis-
tricts "might not on its face be an 'invidious discrimination,' " 1u 
thus perhaps finding no constitutional barrier to a favoring of 
rural districts over urban. But where there is not even that ra-
tionality in the allocation of representation, Mr. Justice Clark 
specifically found, and presumably all others of the majority would 
find, violation of equal protection. So at least the opinions were 
read by the Tennessee legislature and the three-judge federal dis-
trict court to which the Supreme Court remanded Baker; both 
concluded without great difficulty that the original apportion-
ment plan was defective.16 
12 Id. at 197-98. In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Stewart, quoting portions of the 
above passage, emphasized that the Court "today decides three things and no more •.•. " 
Id. at 265. 
13 The record showed that 37% of the voters of Tennessee elected 20 of the 33 
senators, while 40% of the voters elected 63 of the 99 members of the house. 369 U.S. at 
253 (Clark, J., concurring). 
14 Id. at 254. 
15 Id. at 253. 
16 Pursuant to the call of the Governor of Tennessee, the General Assembly convened 
in extraordinary session on May 29, 1962, and enacted two separate reapportionment acts. 
Public Chapters Numbers 1 and 3, June 6, both approved by the Governor June 7, 1962. 
Both acts, despite some improvements from the 1901 statute, were found to be constitu-
tionally defective by the three-judge court on remand. Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 
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Ultimately, then, Baker v. Carr involved two issues, one of 
jurisdiction and one of substance. The problem might be char-
acterized simply, yet not inaccurately, as whether the federal 
courts can and should take jurisdiction of claims that state appor-
tionment schemes violate constitutional guarantees and, if so, how 
the courts should determine and apply relevant standards for 
judgment. Before Baker the first question, whether federal courts 
can exercise jurisdiction in state apportionment cases, had been 
made to appear difficult, both by the Court and commentators. 
Now that the Court has given to this question an understandable 
answer that cuts through doctrinal confusion, some commenta-
tors concentrate on re-fighting that settled issue without facing 
the admittedly difficult second question, that of fixing relevant 
standards. On this second question the Court gave no hint of an 
ultimate answer (and has been criticized accordingly17) beyond the 
placid observation that "we have no cause at this stage to doubt 
the District Court will be able to fashion relief if violations of 
constitutional rights are found .... "18 Behind this confident 
assertion lurk the two hard questions: (1) How shall "violations 
of constitutional rights" be judged? Clearly the Court did not in-
tend final disposition of the question in telling the lower courts 
that they are empowered to act when they find "arbitrary and 
capricious" state action resulting in voter discrimination,19 or ac-
tion that results in "invidious discrimination,"20 or action that is 
"without any possible justification in rationality."21 (2) How shall 
the lower courts "fashion relief"? Mr. Justice Frankfurter gave 
solemn warning of the problems that he believed would be en-
countered in the fulfillment of the task by-passed by the majority. 
"Even assuming the indispensable intellectual disinterested-
ness on the part of judges in such matters, they do not have 
accepted legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies 
to draw upon for making judicial judgments. To charge 
courts with the task of accommodating the incommensurable 
factors of policy that underlie these mathematical puzzles 
(M.D. Tenn. 1962). It is interesting to note that the merits of the 1901 statute were never 
passed on by the court. In a pre-trial conference before the new legislation was enacted, 
the defendants stated that they would not attempt to defend the 1901 law. Id. at 345. 
17 See, e.g., McCioskey, supra note 5, at 62-64. 
18 369 U.S. at 198. 
19 Id. at 226. 
20 Id. at 253 (Clark, J., concurring). 
21 Id. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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is to attribute, however flatteringly, omnicompetence to 
judges."22 
The answer will be suggested here that solution of these problems 
is not beyond judicial competence and that postponement of de-
cision of these questions was not only permissible, but born of 
the wisdom of judicial experience. Once it is conceded, as it must 
be, that the decision of justiciability thrust the Court into a pre-
viously untested arena of judgment, it becomes inevitably clear 
that discretion and valor become one in postponing immediate 
formulation of criteria for future judgment. Nor is there any-
thing novel in announcing for the first time a new proposition of 
constitutional doctrine and leaving its implementation for future 
development on a case-by-case basis.23 
In another sense the two questions suggested above, whether 
the courts should intervene to right apportionment wrongs, and 
how they should do so, amount to a single question only: whether 
the equal protection clause is sturdy enough to support a super-
structure of judicial inquiry into legislative processes heretofore 
described as "political," and correction thereof to the extent 
found constitutionally deficient. It is this issue which prompts 
disagreement between the majority and the dissenters. It should 
be frankly recognized that the framing of issues in terms of 
jurisdiction, justiciability, and standing serves only to mask the 
basic disagreement on whether courts can act profitably in 
the review of legislative arrangements. The issue is not whether 
the equal protection clause is applicable, but whether sufficient 
meaning can be extracted from its imprecise command to serve 
as a basis for remedial action within judicial competence. The 
only conceivable reasons, to put it bluntly, for refusing the courts 
even the power of examination would be a belief either that even 
the grossest malapportionment is within the unrestrained power 
of state constitutions and legislatures, or that the price of seeking 
judicial remedy involves too great a distortion of the judicial 
process. To deny recognition to fundamental constitutional issues 
and to retreat from correction of wrongs discovered by inquiry 
22 Id. at 268. See also id. at 269-70, 329-30; id. at 337 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
23 To cite only recent examples, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); United States 
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Brown v. Board 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Each was criticized initially for its failure to answer future 
questions of application, but the principle announced in each case is still being tested in 
new situations, some of which could not have been anticipated when the decision was 
announced. 
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would be a sad confession of judicial inability. That admission of 
impotence should not be made without first exploring all possi-
bilities and finding them unavailing. This is written in the con-
fident belief that the command of the equal protection clause 
can be vindicated within the framework and traditions of the 
judicial process. 
Those who doubt judicial power seem to say: No matter 
how great the inequities, the courts are not suited to the corrective 
process. Professor Louis Pollak has effectively answered this con-
tention: 
"Does not the answer lie elsewhere than in a quest for 
standards of justiciability? Does not the answer lie in the 
dissenters' apparent view that on the merits, taking their 
complaint at full value, the appellants in Baker v. Carr 
should not prevail? Were not the dissenters really resolving 
the justiciability question by reference to the Court's prior 
reading of the equal protection clause as a concept which did 
not 'deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion of 
political initiative as between its thinly populated counties 
and those having concentrated masses .. .'?"24 
There is considerable justification for reading both the Frank-
furter and Harlan dissents for the proposition that no malappor-
tionment, however severe, should be held to violate the equal 
protection clause.25 If that reading is correct, would it not be 
preferable to encourage argument on that issue of substance 
rather than on artful avoidance of the ultimate question as to 
whether constitutional rights are involved and whether they are 
in fact in jeopardy? 
Perhaps it is still premature to argue that the majority were 
right in allowing the debate to progress to the merits. No one 
who respects legal history can ignore the substantial body of judi-
cial folklore which suggests that courts that would enter the 
"political thicket"26 may find all exits barred by nettles. 
The question is fundamental. Inescapably involved are ques-
tions of judicial power and obligation. To what extent must 
federal courts decide questions properly presented to them, and 
in what narrowly circumscribed circumstances may they properly 
24 Pollak, Judicial Power and "The Politics of the People," 72 YALE L.J. 81, 85 (1962). 
!lll 1169 U.S. at 266, l!l!O. 
:26 The expressive phrase is of course taken from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in 
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
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avoid decision when it is difficult, or likely to be unpopular, or 
when it might lead to frictions that the Constitution was intended 
to avoid? 
II. THE OBLIGATION To DECIDE 
The starting point seems clear. When there is presented to a 
federal court in proper form a question "arising under this Con-
stitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority,"27 the federal court 
to which the question is presented is obligated to decide the case 
except in narrowly confined instances. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall 
stated, or perhaps overstated, the proposition in 1821: 
"It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if 
it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take juris-
diction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature 
may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of 
the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubt-
ful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case 
may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before 
us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of juris-
diction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. 
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. 
Questions may occur, which we would gladly avoid; but we 
cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best 
judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty."28 
The statement, like many others of the Chief Justice, makes 
with telling force a still-valid central point, but leaves little room 
for the qualifications now ordinarily accepted on its generality. 
Without meaning to state those exceptions comprehensively, the 
following enumeration will illustrate the point that the fact of 
judicial power does not always insure its exercise. Then it will be 
possible to search out common denominators that justify self-
restraint in some instances, while demonstrating the impropriety 
of withholding judgment in other circumstances.29 
27 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
28 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). 
29 The exceptional classes listed in the text do not include those suits which do not 
present a "case or controversy" as required by article III of the Constitution. In the 
absence thereof, whether for mootness, because an advisory opinion is sought, or for other 
reason showing absence of a case or controversy, not only is there no mandate for federal 
judicial decision, but it is in fact forbidden. Nor does the present listing include instances 
in which by statute the federal courts are restricted in particular instances from exercising 
jurisdiction that would otherwise be within federal judicial power. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1341-42, 2283 (1958): § 1341 (restriction on interference with state taxing power); 
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1. The "political question" doctrine. Until the decision in 
Baker this was possibly the largest and certainly the most uncon-
fined of the exceptional bases for withholding jurisdiction. 
2. The requirement of standing.30 
3. Avoidance of decision on constitutional questions where 
decision can be based on other grounds. The Court has "developed, 
for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdic-
tion, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a 
large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for 
decision. "31 
4. The doctrine of equitable abstention.32 
5. The doctrine of forum non conveniens.33 
6. The exercise of discretion in granting or withholding de-
claratory relief.34 
7. Refusal of jurisdiction for lack of competence in matters 
of probate35 and domestic relations.36 
Each of the foregoing enumerated bases for restricting federal 
jurisdiction is designed to promote efficiency of judicial admin-
istration or to avoid federal-state conflict. And each undoubtedly 
serves one of those purposes to some extent when sparingly em-
ployed. Yet it must always be remembered that they are in every 
instance devices that limit the exercise of the power of decision 
vested in the federal courts pursuant to the constitutional grant 
of power to Congress, and as specifically conferred on the courts 
by Congress. Where Congress has made no exception to its grant, 
the fair inference is that the federal courts should-or must-act 
in the absence of especially compelling reasons for refusing to do 
§ 1342 (restriction on interference with rate orders of state agencies); and § 2283 (restric-
tion on stay of state court proceedings). See also Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 
(1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958) (restricting issuance of injunctions in labor disputes). 
30 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 
(1923). 
31 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 (1946). 
32 See, e.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); County of Allegheny v. Frank 
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 
U.S. 45 (1959); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. 
City of Thibodau.x, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 
(1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Thompson v. Magnolia 
Petroleum Corp., 309 U.S. 478 (1940). 
33 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958); 
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955). 
34 Sec, e.g., Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952). 
35 See, e.g., Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199 (1918). 
36 See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858). See also HART & 
WECHSLER, TH.E F.ED.ERAL COURTS AND TH.E FED.ERAL SYSTEM 1013-18 (1953). 
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so. It is in this light that nearly all judicially created exceptions to 
the congressional mandate have provoked controversy and divi-
sion within the Court and criticism outside. Of none is this more 
true than in relation to the "political question" doctrine. 
In Baker the complaint plainly alleged a substantial federal 
question, decision of which could be avoided, in the framework 
of established exceptions to the exercise of federal judicial power, 
only if the question presented for decision should be deemed a 
"political question." Whatever else the decision may be, it clearly 
answers that question in the negative, and thus the matter requires 
decision on the merits. Having lost on that ground, those who 
nonetheless favor judicial abstention in the area of apportionment 
raise the spectre of damage to the Court's authority which, as Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter puts it, "ultimately rests on sustained public 
confidence in its moral sanction."37 Professor Robert McCloskey 
has expressed the same concern: "If the public should ever be-
come convinced that the Court is merely another legislature, that 
judicial review is only a euphemism for an additional layer in the 
legislative process, the Court's future as a constitutional tribunal 
would be cast in grave doubt."38 These are solemn warnings; but 
should not the Court equally be concerned about loss of public 
confidence for failure to decide where decision is called for? Fail-
ure of action where the duty to act is mandatory is at least as 
grave as a too-ready willingness to act where artful avoidance is 
possible. Once again, it is apparent that the matter comes down to 
a question whether appropriate standards can be devised. If so, 
no one defends failure to decide. 
A. "Political Questions" and Political Thickets 
Only one observation could be made with complete confidence 
concerning the so-called "political question" cases before the deci-
sion in Baker, and that was that no way had been discovered of 
reconciling all the holdings and opinions dealing with the subject. 
One of the incidental doctrinal benefits in Baker is that Mr. Justice 
Brennan for the Court has assembled the cases with a new orderli-
ness of doctrine that could never have been done by any off-Court 
commentator lacking the fiat of a majority of Supreme Court 
Justices.39 It is easy for those with no affirmative obligation to 
rationalize a decision, whether as dissenters on the Court40 or as 
37 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
38 McCloskey, supra note 5, at 67. 
39 369 U.S. at 210. 
40 369 U.S. at 277-80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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commentators,41 to complain that force-molding of some cases is 
the price of producing a pattern for the future out of what had 
before been chaos. But this is to disregard the fact that synthesis 
has never before been apparent either in Supreme Court decisions 
or commentary by scholars of the Court. The simple truth is that 
the cases, particularly the per curiam decisions,42 simply could not 
be arranged into a meaningful whole. To concede that, in order 
to find that patterned order, it was necessary to "explain" some 
cases to fit the enunciated principle is not in derogation of the 
new orderliness-far from it. Rather, it is simply to recognize that 
coherent synthesis would not otherwise have been cogently possi-
ble. Mr. Justice Brennan, while avoiding the opposite difficulty 
of outright overrulings, nevertheless seems to have recognized, 
even for the record, the problem he faced, when he said: 
"Our discussion, even at the price of extending this opinion, 
requires review of a number of political question cases, in 
order to expose the attributes of the doctrine-attributes 
which, in various settings, diverge, combine, appear, and 
disappear in seeming disorderliness."43 
The Court's systematization of the "political question" cases 
was of course not an end in itself. It was undertaken with the 
specific objective of determining whether earlier decisions could 
on any comprehensive and fair reading be taken as an obstacle 
to decision of the Baker case. As already indicated, this inquiry 
produced as an incidental benefit the most comprehensive and 
orderly analysis of the "political question" doctrine that has yet 
been undertaken in any Supreme Court opinion. Equally, it 
appears to be at least as careful and thorough as any recent analysis 
by a non-Court commentator, who could not in any event catalogue 
cases with equivalent authority. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion 
on the "political question" issue has been approved by some44 and 
41 Neal, supra note 5, at 255-59. Cf. Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961 SUPREME COURT REv. 194, 215-31. 
42 Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958); 
Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. Mccanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson 
v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 
U.S. 916 (1952); Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); South v. Peters, 339 
U.S. 276 (1950); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 
(1946). For Mr. Justice Brennan's handling of these cases, see 369 U.S. at 234-37. 
43 369 U.S. at 210. 
44 Although warning of potential dangers in future litigation, Professor McCloskey 
appears to approve the fact that "the political question doctrine has been considerably 
narrowed." McCloskey, supra note 5, at 61. See also Pollak, supra note 24. 
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criticized by others.45 No matter. The important thing, the useful 
thing, which he accomplished was the bringing of order out of 
chaos. And that, undeniably, he did. At the.risk of oversimplifying 
a still-complex question, it is fair to say that he began with the 
central proposition that "the non-justiciability of a political ques-
tion is primarily a function of the separation of powers."46 To 
constitute a "political question" within this frame there must be 
"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolv-
ing it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dis-
cretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaki~g inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need 
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question."47 
On the basis of that analysis-and the cases support it remark-
ably well-there emerge two central justifications for judicial non-
interference on "political question" grounds. First, any matter 
calling for decision by a parallel and co-equal branch of the na-
tional government, Congress or the executive; and, second, any 
matter where "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" 
are lacking. Clearly, as to the first, decision of state apportionment 
questions does not impinge upon the tripartite separation of 
powers at the national level, so the only relevant question on this 
score is whether adequate standards of judgment can be devised. 
It has already been noted that the Court so stated, at the level of 
simple assertion, that standards are not lacking. If that proposition 
is in fact true, as claimed, then this aspect of the "political ques-
tion" problem vanishes. 
One further inquiry remains in connection with "political 
questions." This is the too-much debated question of the relevancy 
of Colegrove v. Green.48 There can no longer be any doubt that 
Colegrove did not hold that jurisdiction was lacking to decide the 
45 See, e.g., Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAw 
&: CoNTEMP. PROB. 329 (1962); Lucas, supra note 5. See materials cited in note 41 supra. 
46 369 U.S. at 210. 
47 Id. at 217. 
48 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
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claim that the disparity of population among the Illinois con-
gressional districts was an unconstitutional infringement of plain-
tiff's right of franchise. Even Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who spoke 
for three of the four-Justice majority, has acknowledged that the 
refusal to take the case on the merits was "not in the strict sense a 
want of power."49 Rather, it was a ruling that in the particular 
circumstances "a federal court should not entertain" the action.50 
Whatever doubts might have been entertained about the hold-
ing in Colegrove should surely have been dispelled by the Court's 
review on the merits of later cases involving related questions. In 
MacDougall v. Green,51 for example, the Court reviewed the 
merits and found no constitutional defect in an Illinois election 
law requirement of 200 signatures from each of at least fifty coun-
ties for an effective nominating petition. 
On the question of jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial com-
petence to examine questions of alleged deprivation of equal pro-
tection of the laws, there can be no doubt that the Court acted 
·within permissible limits in permitting lower courts to reach the 
merits in Baker and other cases raising related issues. The fact 
that the Court has in the past frequently avoided decision in cases 
that directly or indirectly raised challenges to various apportion-
ment formulas of course does not mean that reluctance to deal 
with difficult questions must remain the norm. As already noted, 
Mr. Justice Brennan provides a satisfactory legal handle for the 
proposition that the Court has never really refused decision of 
apportionment cases even on "political question" grounds, there 
having always been some other basis for refusal of decision.52 But 
even if this is not persuasive to some, as it was not to Justices 
Frankfurter and Harlan,53 it is now of little moment. Since the 
Court admittedly has the power of decision, the only relevant 
question is whether the matter is "meet for judicial determina-
tion. "54 If so, that is, if "judicially manageable standards" can be 
devised, all agree that federal courts should inquire into allega-
tions of constitutional wrong and take appropriate action. 
-10 369 U.S. at 277. 
50 Ibid. Mr. Justice Rutledge, whose vote was necessary to the result in Colegrove, 
concluded only that "the bill should be dismissed for want of equity." 328 U.S. at 565. 
He did not at all deny jurisdiction. 
ul 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
ti2 369 U.S. at 232-37. See also note 42 supra. 
53 Id. at 277-80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
54 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946). 
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B. "Republican Form of Government" 
Apparently the disapprovers do not take any particular excep-
tion thus far (although doubtful as to whether standards for judg-
ment can be found). Instead, the point of difference has now been 
narrowed to an inquiry whether the constitutional guarantee in 
article IV, section 4, of a republican form of government presents 
a "political question" barrier to consideration of apportionment 
cases.55 Mr. Justice Brennan for the majority, agreeing that the 
guarantee clause cases do present "political questions" not ap-
propriate for federal judicial consideration, concluded that the 
apportionment cases do not raise these issues because "the non-
justiciability of such claims has nothing to do with their touching 
upon matters of state governmental organization."56 But here the 
dissenters took issue, particularly Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who 
said that "to divorce 'equal protection' from 'Republican Form' 
is to talk about half a question."57 And again, "The present case 
involves all of the elements that have made the Guarantee Clause 
cases non-justiciable. It is, in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim 
masquerading under a different label."58 Mr. Justice Brennan, 
however, took a close look at all the precedents and concluded 
that the instant case lacked the characteristics common to the 
guarantee clause cases that had made them non-justiciable. 
"The question here is the consistency of state action with the 
Federal Constitution. We have no question decided, or to be 
decided by a political branch of government coequal with this 
Court. Nor do we risk embarrassment of our government 
abroad, or grave disturbance at home if we take issue with 
Tennessee as to the constitutionality of her action here chal-
lenged. Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed in this 
action, ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for 
which judicially manageable standards are lacking. Judicial 
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well devel-
d d f ·1· "59 ope an am1 iar .... 
55 See Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitu• 
tional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962); Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the 
Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 245 (1962). 
56 369 U.S. at 218. 
57 Id. at 301. 
58 Id. at 297. 
59 Id. at 226. Some have suggested that in Baker and earlier cases the Court has read 
too much into the guarantee clause cases by way of a finding of non-justiciability. The 
suggestion is made that, however appropriate may have been the application of the 
equal protection clause in a case of de facto malapportionment such as Baker, the 
guarantee clause should be utilized in cases of de jure malapportionment (as in Michigan, 
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And so we have come full circle. The soundness of the defense of 
judicial intervention and the objections thereto ultimately differ 
only as to whether there are judicially manageable standards. If 
so, under either analysis the "political question" problem largely 
dissolves, whether conceived in general terms or in terms of the 
greater particularity of the guarantee clause. There is, then, no 
escaping the crucial nature of the search for standards. 
III. THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS 
Remarkably few of the already substantial number of critics 
who pronounce their disenchantment with the decision in Baker 
v. Carr have objected on the ground that malapportionment of 
state legislative districts should not be thought to violate the Con-
stitution of the United States. Rather, they have suggested the 
inappropriateness of judicial intervention or, alternatively, that 
this particular decision does not deal adequately with the question 
as to whether workable standards can be devised and successfully 
imposed. It has already been suggested that these expressed doubts 
about judicial power and function--or claimed judicial "omni-
competence," as Mr. Justice Frankfurter would have it60-may 
well be but the external mask for an unstated, or at best obliquely 
hinted, conviction that the Constitution does not extend-and 
cannot be stretched-so far. Both the stated and the implicit ar-
guments are important and deserve reply. The case to be made, 
then, and which will here be attempted, can be caught up in a 
simple proposition: Irrational malapportionment of state legisla-
tures does violate the fourteenth amendment; satisfactory judicial 
standards can be formulated to test the matter; and adequate judi-
cial remedies are available for correction. 
It is striking how little these imagined difficulties with stand-
ards and remedies have troubled the lower federal courts and state 
courts where the issues have so far been tried out. No federal court 
has expressed reluctance to accept jurisdiction and to decide the 
merits; and state courts, though not bound by the jurisdictional 
issues decided in Baker, have also uniformly accepted jurisdiction 
where the voters themselves had recently approved the complained-against apportionment). 
Sec Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican 
Government, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 245 (1962). See also Emerson, Malapportionment and 
Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 66-68 (1962). One may wonder, however, whether the 
command of the guarantee clause is indeed more informative than that of equal pro-
tection. 
60 369 U.S. at 268. 
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of apportionment cases. Even on the question of standards, on the 
difficulties of which the critics place their principal reliance for 
rejecting judicial solution, the federal district courts and state 
trial and appellate courts have suggested thoughtful answers; and 
there is even evidence of an emerging consensus, as will be noted 
later. It is not too much to say that these courts have manifested 
an almost surprising enthusiasm for the task of setting in constitu-
tional order the legislative houses over which they have new-found 
jurisdiction. Unlike the situation following Brown v. Board of 
Education, there is no evidence of judicial foot-dragging about the 
necessity of prompt implementation, no talk of abstention in 
federal courts to await decision in state courts (and, conversely, no 
hesitance by state courts to act when the matter is presented to 
them61), and almost no expressed doubt as to the workability of 
remedies within the traditional judicial competence. Only a very 
strong showing of the absence of judicial power where the courts 
themselves express no doubt would now be sufficient to overcome 
this pattern of judicial momentum. The truth is, however, that 
not only can that kind of showing not be made, but rather that 
available evidence points to formulation of entirely serviceable 
standards and remedies within accepted notions of judicial com-
petence. 
A. Equal Protection in History62 
Writing in 1949, Professors Tussman and tenBroek were more 
accurately prophetic than even they could have anticipated when 
they stated: 
"The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
appears thus to be entering the most fruitful and significant 
period of its career. Virtually strangled in infancy by post-
civil-war judicial reactionism, long frustrated by judicial 
neglect, the theory of equal protection may yet take its right-
ful place in the unfinished Constitutional struggle for democ-
racy."oa 
Their prophecy of a new role for the equal protection clause 
01 But cf. Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296, 303 (R.I. 1962), expressing doubt as to the 
propriety of a state court order to a state legislature, but no doubt as to the power of 
a federal court to issue such an order. 
62 See generally HARrus, THE QuEST FOR EQUALITY (1960); Antieau, Equal Protection 
Outside the Clause, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 362 (1952); Frank &: Munro, The Original Under-
standing of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 CoLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950). 
63 Tussman &: tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF L. REv. 341, 381 
(1949). 
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would have been amply fulfilled by Brown v. Board of Education 
(which must have been what they had in mind); and surely their 
prophetic cup runneth over with Baker v. Carr. The basis for their 
prediction and the proper contemporary meaning of the equal 
protection clause will be subsequently examined; but first the 
amenities require a brief detour into the historic origins of the 
clause, and its judicial development over the nearly one hundred 
years of its existence. 
It can scarcely be doubted that the primary thrust of the 
equal protection clause when the fourteenth amendment was 
ratified in 1868 was to assure equal, or at least more nearly equal, 
rights of citizenship to Negroes, both the newly freed and those 
who had never been slaves.64 The Supreme Court, in fact, with-
out adequate investigation into the historical sources, early con-
cluded that the equal protection clause dealt exclusively with 
protection against racial discrimination. Speaking of the clause 
in The Slaughter-House Cases, Mr. Justice Miller said in 1873: 
"We doubt very much whether any action of a State not 
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a 
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come 
within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provi-
sion for that race and that emergency, that a strong case 
would be necessary for its application to any other."65 
Although the Court, and Mr. Justice Miller himself, soon re-
treated from that narrow and non-literal reading of the clause to 
provide shelter for business interests,66 it was at least true that 
there had been "no contemporary understanding of the relation 
of equal protection to business regulation."67 That, however, was 
to come soon enough. 68 
Two years after The Slaughter-House Cases the Court re-
mained faithful to its conviction that the fourteenth amendment 
was race-related only and thus offered no protection from limita-
tions on the right of franchise based on sex. In 1875 Mr. Chief 
Justice Waite ruled confidently in Minor v. Happersett that "the 
Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of 
suffrage upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws of the 
64 Frank & Munro, supra note 62, at 167-69. 
65 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). 
66 See FAmllfAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 186-87 (1939). 
67 Frank & Munro, supra note 62, at 143. 
68 See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., ll8 U.S. 394 (1886). See also The 
Granger Cases, 94 U.S. 155, 164, 179, 180 (1877). 
662 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
several States which commit that important trust to men alone are 
not necessarily void .... " 69 The Court discussed the issue, how-
ever, only in terms of the privileges and immunities clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, without any reference to the equal pro-
tection clause. The petitioner may well have regarded an appeal 
to equal protection as futile in view of The Slaughter-House 
Cases; and presumably in 1875 that argument would have been 
no more successful than one based on the privileges and immuni-
ties clause. Classification to the voting disadvantage of women was 
not further tested in the Supreme Court and was finally overcome 
by the specifics of the nineteenth amendment almost half a century 
later. 
Had the issue not been stamped with the imprimatur of stare 
decisis at a time when both the privileges and immunities and 
equal protection clauses were subject to restrictive interpretation, 
hindsight suggests that limitation of franchise rights on grounds 
of sex might well have yielded to the importunities of equal pro-
tection when the Court made it clear that the clause had a reach 
far beyond the more restrictive confines of racial discrimination. 
But even under the narrower interpretation of the 1870's, Minor v. 
Happersett suggests nothing contrary to the implications of Baker. 
It was simply a determination that the state could fix voter qualifi-
cations by class. However unlikely a similar result would be today, 
even without the nineteenth amendment,70 the ruling is not to 
be taken as a holding that a state may authorize a weighting of the 
votes of persons otherwise entitled to cast ballots. As will be noted 
subsequently, that specific question has never been ruled on by 
the Supreme Court, although even before Baker the most nearly 
analogous cases strongly suggest disapproval of the dilution of 
voter strength.71 
After the Slaughter-House and Happersett decisions, the equal 
protection clause served in the nineteenth century as a brake on 
various gross racially discriminatory practices, as might have been 
anticipated from the principal aims of the drafters as noted in 
those early cases.72 That the clause did not serve by any means to 
eliminate what would now be regarded as severely discriminatory 
69 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875). 
70 Cf. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
Both invalidated devices under direct or indirect state sponsorship designed to deny 
participation in party primaries to Negro citizens otherwise entitled to vote. 
71 See text at notes 146-51 infra. 
72 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); 
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). 
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state-supported practices, particularly the segregation imposed by 
the Black Codes, 73 is not here the point. All that doctrine has now 
given way under the irresistibly egalitarian pressures implicit in 
the text of the equal protection clause, as construed by the Supreme 
Court in Brown and its progeny. That the struggle for desegrega-
tion is not yet wholly won does not detract from the importance 
of the doctrinal point. Few not emotionally committed to the 
practice of segregation now doubt the correctness of the Court's 
absolutist reading of the equal protection clause on this point. 
Regardless of whether segregation in public schools was intended 
to be forbidden by the fourteenth amendment at the time of its 
adoption, which is at best doubtful,74 later research has demon-
strated that the words of the equal protection clause were delib-
erately chosen, resulting in a formulation that "had both sweep 
and the appearance of a careful enumeration of rights, and it had 
a ring to echo in the national memory of libertarian beginnings."75 
Specifically, the phrase "equal protection of the laws," selected 
primarily in reference to matters of racial discrimination, also 
carried with it the broadness of phrasing characteristic of organic 
law not intended for frequent or easy amendment. The lesson 
taught by the commerce clause as to the easy adaptability to con-
temporary necessities of a broadly phrased power, and by the con-
venient flexibility of a generalized restriction such as that in the 
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, could not have been 
lost upon the draftsmen who chose "equal protection of the laws" 
in preference to an earlier version that would have limited the 
equal protection guarantee to the rights of life, liberty, and prop-
erty, supplemented by a necessary and proper clause.76 
Certainly this was the vantage point of the ruling in Brown 
when the Court candidly stated that "in approaching this prob-
lem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment 
was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was writ-
ten. We must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout 
the Nation."77 
73 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For a good account of the re-establishment 
of segregation after Reconstruction, see ·wooDWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 
(1955). 
74 Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. 
REv. 1 (1955); Frank 8: Munro, supra note 62, at 153-62. 
7li Bickel, supra note 74, at 62. 
76 Id. at 60. 
77 Bro%'ll v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954). 
664 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
Of course it is proper to observe that, bold as the Court's ac-
tion may have seemed in outlawing the long-established segrega-
tion mores through the device of the equal protection clause, yet 
segregation was a matter at least related to the central purpose of 
providing discrimination-free citizenship for Negroes. Candor 
requires concession that the right of franchise, also not explicitly 
within the intended reach of the drafters, does not relate at all 
to discrimination based on race or color or previous condition 
of servitude.78 
Yet there is nothing novel in this. The very essence of con-
stitutional litigation is the application of existing constitutional 
text to novel situations. The test is not whether the particular ap-
plication was contemplated by the drafters, ratifiers, and other 
participants in the process of constitutional formulation. So long 
as the new application was not forbidden and is consistent with 
the general framework of constitutional purpose, the rest can be 
left to judicial craftsmanship. Perhaps the ultimate test is, to use 
Mr. Justice Holmes' words from a different context, "the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market .... "79 Brown and Baker alike have amply satisfied the 
test of general public acceptance of the principles announced-
and apparently as well of the broader implications. 
Apart from the due process clause, scarcely any other clause 
in the Constitution has proved itself more adaptable to the temper 
of the times than the equal protection clause. After all, as already 
observed, it appears as a broadly phrased limitation on the states, 
as categorical or as flexible as one might wish to read it. There 
are, of course, other specific requirements of equal, or at least 
non-discriminatory, treatment in the Constitution, such as the 
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, and the thirteenth, 
fifteenth, and nineteenth amendments. 80 It is no longer surprising 
to find equal protection overtones in the due process clauses of 
the fifth81 and fourteenth amendments,82 and even in the first 
amendment and the commerce clause.83 It follows that the equal 
protection clause in the fourteenth amendment should be re-
78 Except, of course, in the case not here at issue where a Negro is denied the vote 
because of his race (see note 70 supra), or in the exceptional case of Gomillion v. Light· 
foot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
79 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
80 See Antieau, supra note 62. 
81 See especially Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
82 Antieau, supra note 62, at 362-66. 
83 Id. at 366-68, 370-72. 
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garded simply as a general catchall provision to ensure that any 
discriminatory action indulged in by a state or with state approval, 
not elsewhere specifically forbidden, may fall within the general 
prohibition. 
So at least the Court has always used the clause. However 
clear it may have been that matters of economic regulation and 
social welfare legislation were not within the "original understand-
ing," nonetheless the clause was early and long used for just those 
purposes. Professor Robert Harris, after analysis of 554 decisions 
of the Supreme Court in which the equal protection clause was 
invoked, found that "426, or 76.9 per cent, dealt with legislation 
affecting economic interests. In turn, 255 of these decisions dealt 
with regulation, and 171 with taxation."84 The influx of these 
cases began in significant numbers with the casual pronounce-
ment by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in 1886 that the Court did not 
wish to hear argument on the question whether the equal pro-
tection clause applied to corporations. "We are all of the opinion 
that it does."85 Subsequent developments in the history of the 
clause as a regulation of economic interests are well summarized 
by Professor Harris: 
"Throughout its constitutional history the equal protection 
clause has undergone alternative periods of simultaneous 
judicial expansion and contraction. From 1873, when cases 
involving economic interests alone began coming to the 
Court, until 1937 there was a judicial expansion of the clause 
to protect interests of business and property against dis-
criminatory state action. Simultaneously, the Court con-
tracted the privileges and immunities clause and a short time 
later considerably restricted the scope of equal protection 
with respect to discriminations based upon race. Then in 
1937 it began to restrict equal protection as a shield of eco-
nomic interests and to continue an expansion of the clause 
begun two years earlier in the area of racial discrimination."86 
B. The Two Sides of Equal Protection 
What has gone before suggests, at least preliminarily, the 
point now sought to be made. The equal protection clause, in 
84 HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 62, at 59. 
Sli The case was Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., ll8 U.S. 394 (1886). The 
remarks of the Chief Justice from the bench, quoted above, were said in the presence 
of and apparently with the silent acquiescence of Mr. Justice Miller, who had in 1873 
denied the likely application of equal protection concepts to anything except matters of 
racial discrimination. See CORWIN, THE CONSfITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
1143 (1953). 
86 HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 62, at 58. 
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serving its function of general restraint upon unreasonable classi-
fications imposed by state authority, has been invoked in a number 
of diverse contexts. Analytically, however, the cases may be 
grouped into two principal categories, each of which has generated 
a remarkably different application of the equal protection con-
cept. So different is the doctrinal base for the two that one might 
almost say there are two equal protection clauses, or, at least, 
since some kinds of discriminatory classification are more readily 
forbidden than others, that there is something akin to a scale 
of preferences within the equal protection clause itself. 
The scheme of classification internal to the equal protection 
clause may be stated first as a general proposition, and then ex-
plained in more detail. Where the state, in its police power capac-
ity to regulate health, morals, and general welfare, imposes a 
classification scheme intended to regulate economic or social wel-
fare matters, the coverage of "reasonableness" is comfortably loose, 
and there rests upon him who would challenge the classification a 
heavy burden in seeking to overcome the presumption of consti-
tutionality. But where the classification impinges upon the "basic 
civil rights of man,"87 the latent libertarianism that always lies 
close to the surface of equal protection emerges either to forbid all 
classification, because none is permissible, as in segregation cases, 
or at the least to overcome the presumption of constitutionality 
and to demand rigorous examination of the standards set. 
Before more particular examination is made of this suggested 
classificatory scheme within a clause which itself makes classifica-
tion suspect except for good motive and to promote reasonable ends, 
this caveat should be entered. The two sides of equal protection 
here suggested have not been separately identified by the Court as 
a whole, or even clearly articulated by individual members. Rather, 
the common practice has been, when equal protection is invoked 
and the claim is destined for rejection, to deal with the question 
in the loosest possible generalization, fortified by a string of now-
familiar citations dealing with classification in the regulation of 
economic interests. To recite only recent examples, in McGowan 
v. Maryland88 Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated the commonly 
accepted formula for these cases when he said: "A statutory dis-
crimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably 
may be conceived to justify it."89 Similarly, in Baker, two of the 
87 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
88 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
89 Id. at 426. 
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Justices who concurred in the invocation of the equal protection 
clause in connection with state legislative apportionment none-
theless used as their definitional touchstone the standard of "in-
vidious discrimination,"00 a phrase drawn from Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co.91 in which a clearly unequal classification of economic 
interests was sustained for lack of a showing of "invidious dis-
crimination.'' 
Examination of cases decided under the equal protection 
clause reveals, however, a more orderly pattern in the equal pro-
tection cases than the imprecise generalizations quoted above 
would indicate. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing the opinion of the 
Court in Baker, did not lend the force of the majority opinion 
to any suggestion that the standards which he described as "well-
developed and familiar" are to be found in the line of cases 
dealing with regulation of economic matters. It is the aim of the 
following discussion to analyze the two lines of equal protection 
cases and suggest that the standards appropriate for application 
in state legislative apportionment litigation are those developed 
in connection with cases raising questions involving the "basic 
civil rights of man." 
I. Regulation of Economic Interests. The course of the equal 
protection clause has not been fundamentally different from that 
of the due process clause. As the Reconstruction period drew to a 
close both due process and equal protection became chiefly identi-
fied with substantive rights, and particularly with judicially im-
posed limitations on the power of states to regulate economic 
affairs. Both aspects of that story have been well chronicled92 and 
will not be repeated. It is sufficient here to note that since the mid-
thirties the Court has regularly disavowed any significant judicial 
authority to pass upon the validity of state economic regulation 
under either the due process or the equal protection clause. Due 
process claims appear to be altogether unavailing in this area, 93 
oo 369 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring); 369 U.S. at 253 (Clark, J., concurring). 
01 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
92 Due Process: FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HoLllrES AND THE SUPREME COURT app. 
(1938). For a more recent statement, see Lewis, A Newspaperman's View: The Role of 
the Supreme Court, 45 A.B.A.J. 9ll (1959). For the somewhat different regard which 
many state courts have for due process provisions in their own constitutions, see Carpenter, 
Our Constitutional Heritage: Economic Due Process and the State Courts, 45 A.B.A.J. 1027 
(1959): Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. 
REv. 92 (1950). 
Equal Protection: HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 62. 
03 Since Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), substantive due process has been 
applied mainly in connection with claims of individual liberty, such as those involving first 
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and equal protection claims in the area of economic regulation 
have been successful only rarely. 94 
That resort to equal protection should ever upset a state regu-
latory scheme is testimony not to the vitality of the concept of 
judicial supervision of the state regulatory process, but that the 
very words "equal protection of the laws" can scarcely be ignored 
in some few situations where the economic hurt is severe and 
without any conceivable justification in state policy. Thus, in 
Morey v. Doud,95 involving the only important application of 
equal protection in recent years to invalidate state legislation 
regulating economic activity, the act created a closed class by 
exempting money orders issued by American Express Company 
from regulations applicable to all other issuers of like orders. For 
such a statutory discrimination to be sustained, Mr. Justice Bur-
ton said, it "must be based on differences that are reasonably re-
lated to the purposes of the Act in which it is found." 96 In this case 
no such relationship was found, but only a special exemption in 
behalf of one favored company. Even on that premise the deci-
sion evoked three dissents, one by Mr. Justice Black, and one 
subscribed to by both Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter feared in this a return to a discarded past and 
stated his view of the equal protection clause in these words: 
"Legislation is essentially empiric. It addresses itself to the 
more or less crude outside world and not to the neat, logical 
models of the mind. Classification is inherent in legislation; 
the Equal Protection Clause has not forbidden it. To recog-
nize marked differences that exist in fact is living law; to 
disregard practical differences and concentrate on some ab-
stract identities is lifeless logic."97 
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting separately, expressed the same idea 
in objecting "to the use of general provisions of the Constitution to 
restrict narrowly state power over state domestic affairs."08 But 
amendment claims. See also Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
94 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 
562 (1949) [distinguished in Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-30 (1959)]; 
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946); Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 
(1937); Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936). 
95 354 U.S. 457 (1957). 
96 Id. at 465. 
97 Id. at 472. 
98 Id. at 471. 
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then, noting the separate uses to which equal protection, like due 
process, may be put, he continued: 
"I think state regulation should be viewed quite differently 
where it touches or involves freedom of speech, press, reli-
gion, petition, assembly, or other specific safeguards of the 
Bill of Rights. It is the duty of this Court to be alert to see 
that these constitutionally preferred rights are not abridged."99 
Whether Morey v. Doud and its few companions are regarded 
as rare examples of invidious discrimination unsupported by any 
legislative purpose, or whether merely as judicial sports, it is 
clear at least that they are very exceptional. The volume and 
variety of cases in which state economic regulation has been up-
held against an equal protection challenge is impressive in size 
and in the summary nature of the judicial response to the issue.100 
2. Regulation of "Basic Civil Rights of Man." Equal protec-
tion and due. process alike got off to a slow start as defenders of 
individual liberty. But just as surely as the restraining power of 
these clauses upon state economic regulation has declined almost 
to zero, substantive content on the side of individual liberty has 
been poured into them at an accelerating rate. Now is not the 
time to recount this aspect of the development of the due process 
clause, nor is more necessary than a reminder of the role that the 
due process clause has played in the absorption of the fundamental 
human rights of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amend-
ment as a limitation upon the states.101 The parallel develop-
oo lbid. 
100 Recent cases include the following: Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. 
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1962); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 
(1954); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); AFL v. American Sash 
Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1948); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River 
Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). Earlier decisions that remain leading cases for 
statement of still-controlling doctrine include the following: Nashville, C. 8: St. L. Ry. 
v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); Semler v. Dental 
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 
(1935); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). 
101 First Amendment: Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech); 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) ( freedom of the press); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 
U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (freedom of assembly); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) 
(freedom of association); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (freedom of 
religion); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) (separation of church and state). 
Fourth Amendment: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
Sixth Amendment: Gideon v. Wainwright, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4291 (U.S. March 18, 1963) 
overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which had held that counsel was required 
only in capital cases and in other cases where absence of counsel would deny due process. 
See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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ment of the equal protection clause as a guardian of individual 
liberties was, until recent years, less dramatic, but nonetheless 
significant. With decision of the series of cases that have finally 
eradicated "separate but equal" as an excuse for segregation, 
and the series of cases prompted by Baker, the equal protection 
clause moves strikingly into the forefront of the contest for the 
advancement of individual liberty. Significant cases in this nearly 
century-long development are enumerated in the footnote be-
low,102 and the historical highlights are discussed in the remain-
der of this section. 
Classifications forbidden by the equal protection clause may be 
grouped into three categories. First are those in which no purpose 
at all is demonstrated or, as Mr. Justice Brennan phrased the same 
idea in Baker, where "a discrimination reflects no policy, but 
simply arbitrary and capricious action."103 In the same case Mr. 
Justice Clark concluded that the Tennessee apportionment at 
issue was so devoid of rational policy that he could describe it as 
"a topsy-turvical of gigantic proportions" or as "a crazy quilt 
without rational basis."104 As will be noted, a number of state 
Eighth Amendment: Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (cruel and 
unusual punishment). 
102 Malapportionment: Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
Obligation of state to provide indigents with transcript necessary for appeal: Smith 
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956). Cf. Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206, 208 (1951) (prevention of timely 
appeal); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257 (1942) (discriminatory denial of right of 
appeal). 
Segregation: State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959); Gayle v. Browder, 
352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor &: City Council 
v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin 
v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel. 
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
Restrictive covenants: Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1 (1948). 
Jury service: Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 
(1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); 
Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 
306 U.S. 354 (1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 
(l
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0). f "al a· . . . G ill" L. h f 36' Other forms o raa 1scnmmation: om 10n v. 1g toot, .., U.S. 339 (1960) 
(racially motivated gerrymandering); Takahashi v. Fish &: Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 
(1948) (limitation of livelihood); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (limitation of 
land ownership); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (limitation of livelihood). See 
also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (discrimination against aliens). But cf. Ex parte 
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi 
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
Sterilization of "habitual criminals": Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
103 369 U.S. at 226. 
104 Id. at 254. 
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legislative apportionments are defective in this sense of failing to 
supply any logically discernible standard. Apportionment formulas 
which produce discriminations of this kind appear to be highly 
vulnerable. 
A second classification which may fall under the ban of equal 
protection is that in which the class lines are dra"t-vn in a way 
which is on its face rational, but which nonetheless proves on closer 
examination to include within a single classification individual 
members not like others in the same group, or fails to include 
some that are like those in the group selected for favored or 
disfavored treatment. This is the problem of over-inclusion and 
under-inclusion.105 These are not cases of forbidden classification, 
strictly speaking, but instances in which the means selected are 
defective. On the whole, the Court has not insisted upon rigorous 
conformity to this standard in passing upon state action in regula-
tion of economic interests. The presumption of constitutionality 
has proved a convenient carpet under which to sweep irregular-
ities of classification. But where the presumption of constitution-
ality is reversed,106 as here suggested to be proper in franchise cases, 
apportionments that result in gross disparities in the weighting of 
votes will of course be difficult to justify. 
A third classification is the one most clearly condemned by 
the equal protection clause. This is legislative classification of 
subject matter where there are no permissible bases for classifica-
tion. The outstanding examples previously adjudicated are, of 
course, classifications by race, now forbidden out of hand, and 
classifications on grounds of alienage which, in some areas, such 
as opportunity to earn a livelihood, are also beyond the reach of 
a state's classificatory power.107 
The developing significance of the equal protection clause as 
a guardian of individual liberty has been demonstrated most com~ 
prehensively and dramatically in the gradual case-by-case erection 
of a total barrier to state-approved racial discrimination. In the 
early years following the adoption of the fourteenth amendment 
1011 See Tussman &: tenBroek, supra note 63. 
100 See Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471, 477-78 (D. Colo. 1962); Moss v. Burk-
hart, 207 F. Supp. 885, 891 (W.D. Okla. 1962). Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 
543-45 (1942) (Stone, C. J., concurring); Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal 
Constitution, 27 LAW &: CoNTEIIIP. PROB. 329, 369 (1962); Lewis, Legislative Apportion-
ment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1057, 1086 (1958). See also text at notes 
115-44 infra. But cf. W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
101 See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish &: Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 
239 U.S. 33 (1915). Cf. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
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the Court saw little in the clause save a limitation on discrimina-
tion in the selection of jurors. Originally, even here, it was only 
overt discrimination by statute or judicial participation in juror 
selection that was condemned.108 By the middle of the twentieth 
century forbidden discrimination was found, even apart from ex-
plicit exclusion on grounds of race, in long-standing patterns of 
jury composition which did not in fact include N egroes.100 
The developing role of the equal protection clause in con-
nection with segregation is similar. While the clause was being 
used increasingly to strike down economic classifications, segrega-
tion was considered to be a rational classification so long as the 
facilities provided, although "separate," were "equal."110 Al-
though the doctrine was not destined to survive, its demise was, 
to say the least, lingering. Hints along the way, ever stronger, 
were offered in 1917,111 1938,112 and 1950;113 :finally the turnabout 
came in 1954.114 Now, however, there can be no mistaking that 
any classification on grounds of race is forbidden. 
The equal protection concept has had a similarly expansionist 
history in relation to state action whose hostile thrust was aimed 
at non-citizens because of the fact of alienage, as often further 
distorted by racial bias as well. The earliest of these cases, and still 
the doctrinal base for most that have followed, is Yick W o v. 
Hopkins.115 The San Francisco ordinance involved in that case, 
apparently fair on its face, required the licensing of all laundries 
within the corporate limits of the city and county except those 
built of brick or stone. Presumptively the ordinance was designed 
as a police measure to reduce the hazard of fires in wooden, per-
haps ramshackle, laundry structures. Yet the undisputed facts 
were that, although permission to continue operation in wooden 
buildings was denied to petitioners and 200 others, "all of whom 
happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chinese subjects, 
are permitted to carry on the same business under similar condi-
tions."116 Mr. Justice Matthews, writing for a unanimous Court, 
108 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); 
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). 
109 See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 
463 (1947); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). 
110 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
111 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
112 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
113 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
114 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
115 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
116 Id. at 374. 
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concluded that no reason for this unequal treatment existed 
"except hostility to the race and nationality to which the peti-
tioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not justified."117 
In short, the facts provided vivid testimony of the administration 
of a law, however fair on its face, "with a mind so unequal and 
oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that 
equal protection of the laws" which is secured by the fourteenth 
amendment.118 Two things about the case should be observed for 
their relevance today. First, the Court looked at the pattern of 
administration under the ordinance and unhesitatingly found in 
that performance sufficient evidence of discriminatory purpose 
to invoke equal protection. Second, upon a demonstration of the 
fact of unequal administration of the ordinance, any presumptive 
validity that might otherwise have attached disappeared; and the 
failure of the city to offer justification apart from racial hostility 
required invalidation of the ordinance. 
A further matter of special interest about Yick Wo is a dictum 
of great relevance to the current apportionment cases. Emphasiz-
ing that a person's right to earn a livelihood should not be held 
"at the mere will of another," Mr. Justice Matthews analogized 
from a related proposition which he apparently believed was be-
yond contest. 
"There are many illustrations that might be given of this 
truth, which would make manifest that it was self-evident in 
the light of our system of jurisprudence. The case of the 
political franchise of voting is one. Though not regarded 
strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded 
by a society according to its will, under certain conditions, 
nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental political right, 
because preservative of all rights."119 
Later cases have confirmed and strengthened the proposition 
that state legislation which displays, on its face or in its admin-
istration, a hostility to aliens as a class is at least subject to "strict 
scrutiny of the classification"120 and, if racial hostility is present, 
to the probability of invalidation. Truax v. Raich121 involved an 
attack upon an Arizona law which required all Arizona employers 
of more than five workers to hire not less than eighty percent 
117 Ibid. 
118 Id. at 373. 
110 Id. at 370. 
120 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
121 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
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qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States. 
Raich, an alien who worked as a cook in a restaurant which had 
more than five employees, was about to lose his job solely because 
of the state law's coercive effect on his employer. The Court in-
validated the law and declared that Raich, as a lawfully admitted 
alien, had a federal privilege to enter and abide in any state and 
thereafter a right to enjoy the equal protection of the laws where 
he resided. Accordingly, the state could not restrict the right of 
all lawfully resident aliens to engage in otherwise lawful employ-
ment. Although the Court conceded that in some respects the state 
could treat aliens differently than citizens,122 special justification 
was required in each such case. Here that burden had not been 
met: 
"[U]nderlying the classification is the authority to deal with 
that at which the legislation is aimed. The restriction now 
sought to be sustained is such as to suggest no limit to the 
State's power of excluding aliens from employment if the 
principle underlying the prohibition of the act is con-
ceded."123 
The most recent of the restriction-on-employment cases, Taka-
hashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n,124 held invalid a California stat-
ute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons 
"ineligible to citizenship," a classification which included resi-
dent-alien Japanese and precluded such persons from earning a 
living as commercial fishermen in the California coastal waters. 
The Court held that the State of California had failed to show, 
as required in Truax, a "special public interest with respect to 
any particular business ... that could possibly be deemed to sup-
port the enactment ... .''125 Thus, Mr. Justice Black, for the ma-
jority, found it unnecessary to examine petitioner's contention 
that the measure was enacted as a result of "racial antagonism 
directed solely against the Japanese.''126 Mr. Justice Murphy, con-
curring, went further to develop at some length compelling evi-
dence in support of the proposition that the statute was "designed 
solely to discriminate against such persons in a manner incon-
122 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Mccready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 
(1877). See also Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Crane v. New York, 
239 U.S. 195 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 174 (1915). 
123 Truax. v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 43. 
124 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
125 Truax. v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 43. 
126 334 U.S. at 418. 
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sistent with the concept of equal protection of the laws. Legisla-
tion of that type is not entitled to wear the cloak of constitution-
ality."121 
The other principal class of cases in which discrimination on 
grounds of race or alienage is said to be involved relates to laws 
restricting ownership or occupancy of land to citizens. The root 
case was Terrace v. Thompson,128 in which the Court upheld a 
classification restricting ownership of land in the state of Washing-
ton to citizens and aliens eligible for citizenship who had in good 
faith made the declaration of intent to become citizens required 
by the naturalization laws. Truax v. Raich was distinguished, the 
Court concluding that the requisite showing of the state's special 
interest was sustained by the fact that "the quality and allegiance 
of those who own, occupy and use the farmlands within its borders 
are matters of highest importance and affect the safety and power 
of the State itself."129 That case, however, was sharply limited in 
Oyama v. California130 and Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n. 
The California Alien Land Law construed in Oyama in effect 
forbade aliens ineligible for American citizenship to acquire, own, 
occupy, lease, or transfer agricultural land. In a proceeding by the 
state to escheat two parcels of land said to have been acquired in 
violation of the statute, the Court recognized the potentiality for 
discrimination in the statute and that such discrimination could be 
sustained only if there was "compelling justification."131 But under 
the facts no justification was shown where the escheat, if permitted, 
would take away land recorded in the name of an American citizen, 
a minor, solely because the land had been paid for by his father, 
a Japanese alien ineligible for naturalization. So the Court could 
only conclude that "the discrimination is based solely on his 
parents' country of origin .... "132 Although Terrace v. Thomp-
son was not specifically overruled, state courts have interpreted the 
later decisions in Oyama and Takahashi as repudiating the doc-
trine that ownership of land could be limited to citizens and aliens 
eligible for citizenship.133 
121 Id. at 422. 
128 263 U.S. 197 (1923). See also Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 
2G3 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923). 
120 263 U.S. at 221. 
130 332 U.S. 633 (1948). Four members of the Court would have overruled Terrace 
v. Thompson outright. Id. at 649, 672. 
131 332 U.S. at 640. 
132 Ibid. 
133 See Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); Namba v. Mccourt, 
185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949), 
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Skinner v. 0 klahoma134 involved a very different kind of situa-
tion, but again one in which the Court recognized that legislation 
is on its face suspect when it involves limitation on "one of the 
basic civil rights of man,"135 and is accordingly subject to "strict 
scrutiny."136 At issue was the validity of Oklahoma's Habitual 
Criminal Sterilization Act, which defined habitual criminals to in-
clude any person convicted two or more times of felonies involving 
moral turpitude and thereafter convicted and sentenced in Okla-
homa for such a crime. Although this definition included larceny, 
embezzlement was specifically exempted by statute, and in this the 
Court found "a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination. Okla-
homa makes no attempt to say that he who commits larceny by 
trespass or trick or fraud has biologically inheritable traits which 
he who commits embezzlement lacks."137 One may doubt whether 
any classification would survive which contemplated sterilization 
of some habitual criminals but not of others,138 but the Court was 
not required to reach that ultimate proposition where, as in this 
case, 
"We have not the slightest basis for inferring that that line 
[between larceny by fraud and embezzlement] has any sig-
nificance in eugenics, nor that the inheritability of criminal 
traits follows the neat legal distinctions which the law has 
marked between these two offenses."139 
In 1956 still another facet of equal protection was uncovered. 
In Griffin v. Illinois140 the Court ruled that in a criminal case a 
state may not administer its law "so as to deny adequate appellate 
review to the poor while granting such review to all others."141 
That case involved the furnishing without cost to an indigent 
defendant of the transcript of the trial proceedings necessary un-
der state law for appellate review; failure to make provision for 
such transcript was held, interestingly enough, to violate both 
due process and equal protection. Since that time comparable state 
practices have been found similarly vulnerable in a series of cases 
expounding the basic proposition announced in Griffin, and 
134 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
135 Id. at 541. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 But cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
139 316 U.S. at 542. 
140 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
141 Id. at 13. 
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making clear that its reach was retroactive as well as prospective.142 
Principal reliance on equal protection seems also to follow from 
the later cases. In Burns v. Ohio,143 for example, Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren stated that "the imposition by the State of financial bar-
riers restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent 
criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice 
Under Law." 
While it may seem that there is little logical identity among 
the matters thus far discussed, freedom from discrimination on 
grounds of race or alienage, the right to have offspring, the right 
to an appeal in a criminal case free of the handicap of poverty, 
and the right not to have one's vote diluted by malapportionment, 
yet there is also a strong kinship in each as "one of the basic civil 
rights of man." In this is found the rationalizing principle in ex-
planation of the two sides of equal protection. Where the matter 
subject to regulation is economic in nature or pertains to social wel-
fare, the presumption of constitutionality will outride all but the 
most exigent claims of legislative discrimination. But where the 
preferred freedoms are involved, upon challenge the presumption 
is reversed; and the state's rationale for any unequal treatment, 
subjected to "strict scrutiny," will be sustained only upon a 
showing of "compelling justification." 
There can scarcely be doubt that the right of franchise is one 
of those basic rights. As the Court long ago stated in Yick Wo v. 
H ophins, the political franchise "is regarded as a fundamental 
political right, because preservative of all rights."144 
C. Equal Protection: A Contemporary Meaning 
With the decisions in Brown and Baher the libertarian side of 
the equal protection clause has fully matured. As a shield against 
limitation of individual liberties at the hands of state governments, 
it must be ranked second in importance only to the due process 
clause; and of course the close relationship between the two is 
very marked.145 Neither clause any longer has much to say about 
1-12 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); McCrary v. Indiana, 364 U.S. 277 (1960); 
Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192 (1960); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Ross v. 
Schneckloth, 357 U.S. 575 (1958); Eskridge v. Washington State Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 
(1958). 
143 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959). 
144 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
14G For example, the possibility has been noted that, to the extent that the equal 
protection clause of its own force prohibits discrimination in the selection of jurors, 
such discrimination would mean that any resulting trial would violate due process. Fay 
v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 n.27 (1947). See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13 
(1956). 
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the state's power to regulate economic activities, even in almost 
irrational ways, so long as any mischief could be imagined on 
which the legislative policy might be thought to bear. On the other 
hand, both clauses are strongly partisan in their interest in pro-
tecting the preferred freedoms relating to individual liberty. The 
due process clause sometimes speaks through portions of the Bill 
of Rights and sometimes of its own force, while the equal pro-
tection clause speaks always in its own name, to forbid segrega-
tion, to require equality in rights of appeal in criminal cases, to 
limit eugenic experiments in limitation of the right of procrea-
tion-and now, to forbid irrational arrangements of voters into 
election districts. On the basis of this analysis the applicability of 
the equal protection clause to voting discriminations is perfectly 
apparent, indeed cries out for application, if only exercise of the 
right of franchise is recognized as a "basic civil right of man." 
0£ this there can surely be no doubt. In a constitutional de-
mocracy, where the power of decision is vested in representative 
government, the right of franchise is all-important. The individ-
ual member of the body politic has no opportunity to participate 
in the governing process except through the ballot. This simple 
truth has always been recognized by the Supreme Court in the 
context of challenges to the power of Congress to protect the 
integrity of the ballot for members of Congress. In United States 
v. Classic146 the Court recognized the importance of the right of 
franchise in these terms: "The right of the people to choose ... 
is a right established and guaranteed by the Constitution and 
hence is one secured by it to those citizens and inhabitants of 
the state entitled to exercise the right."147 This means that Con-
gress may protect against intimidation of voters,148 failure to count 
votes honestly,149 and ballot-box stuffing.150 So important is the 
free exercise of the right of franchise at all relevant stages of the 
election process that the party primary has also been included 
within the above enumeration of protections surrounding the 
election itself, as well as within the protection of the fifteenth 
amendment,151 and presumably the fourteenth to the extent that 
146 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
147 Id. at 314. 
148 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). 
149 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915). 
150 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880). 
151 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
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the equal protection clause is a guarantor against discrimination 
in the free exercise of the ballot. 
Presumably, then, it is not anywhere denied that the right 
to vote is a fundamental right deserving of whatever special pro-
tections are afforded by the Constitution. The at-best faint denial 
of this proposition is advanced on the ground that, whatever 
the importance of these rights, they are subject to "reasonable" 
classifications, and that the Supreme Court has so held in two 
principal cases, MacDougall v. Green152 and South v. Peters,153 
and several related cases more or less dependent on the same prin-
ci ple.1u4 
The first thing that should be said is that detractors from 
judicial intervention in behalf of equalizing state legislative dis-
tricts cannot have it both ways. These cases, plus the ubiquitous 
Colegrove v. Green, have sometimes been cited for the proposi-
tion that federal courts should not entertain actions for declara-
tory or injunctive relief against claimed malapportionment in 
state or congressional election districts.155 To use some or all of 
the same cases for a holding that the equal protection clause does 
not forbid the districting at issue is to ask too much of judicial 
pronouncement. Putting aside this somewhat querulous point, 
however, something should be said at least of MacDougall v. 
Green and South v. Peters. 
MacDougall is not apposite. The object of the action in that 
case was to enjoin enforcement of an Illinois law requiring that 
a petition to form, and to nominate candidates for, a new political 
party be signed by at least 25,000 qualified voters, including at 
least 200 from each of at least fifty counties within the state. Two 
sentences of the Court's per curiam opinion have been read to 
deny the applicability of equal protection concepts to apportion-
ment generally. They are: 
"To assume that political power is a function exclusively 
of numbers is to disregard the practicalities of government 
.... It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for this 
Court, applying such broad constitutional concepts as due 
process and equal protection of the laws, to deny a State the 
152 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
163 339 U.S. 276 (1950). 
164 See Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); 
Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Remmey 
v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 921 
(1952); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947). 
155 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 277-80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as 
between its thinly populated counties and those having con-
centrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have 
practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at 
the polls not available to the former."156 
Putting aside the fact that this case, unlike Baker, involved a con-
gressional election, which in truth seems not a very important 
distinction,157 the real difference inheres in the purpose which the 
Illinois statute was intended to serve. However wise or unwise 
the legislation, its aim was simply to insure that any political party, 
as a condition of initial access to the ballot, should have at least a 
minimal base of support (200 signatures) in at least fifty counties 
(fewer than half) in the state. It is quite a different thing to per-
mit disproportionate weighting of. the votes of qualified voters 
in every primary and general election, to the continuing advantage 
of some and the continuing disadvantage of others. To say that 
the state is not obligated to allow every aspiring political party, 
including irresponsible ones, to participate in the official election 
process is very different from saying that it has no obligation to 
treat all registered voters equally. The quoted portions of the 
MacDougall opinion, however valid in the context of that case, 
should not be carried over as dictum to influence future decisions 
involving the very different question of malapportionment. 
Nor should South v. Peters be relied on as precedent in support 
of continued malapportionment. Although the Court there re-
fused to set aside the so-called county unit system in Georgia, 
despite severe population disparities in the representation for-
mula, 158 the _two-paragraph per curiam opinion is not reasoned; 
and, brief though it is, it is so ambiguous on the question here 
relevant that it is not clear what the holding is. The three-judge 
district court had dismissed the petition, presumably on the 
merits,159 so the Supreme Court's affirmance can be read as a deci-
sion on the merits. However, the only reason given was that "fed-
eral courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers in 
cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical dis-
156 335 U.S. at 283-84. 
157 See Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v. 
Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13 (1962); Comment, Challenges to Congressional Districting: After 
Baker v. Carr Does Colegrove v. Green Endure?, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 98 (1963). 
158 Cf. Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated and remanded, 31 
U.S.L. WEEK 4285 (U.S. March 18, 1963). 
159 South v. Peters, 89 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Ga. 1950). 
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tribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions."160 
This is scarcely the language of decision on the merits, but rather 
of withdrawal from decision on equitable grounds. The uncertainty 
of meaning is further compounded by the fact that, of the three 
Supreme Court decisions cited in presumed support of the above-
mentioned statement, one was a decision on the merits (MacDou-
gall v. Green), but on a different matter, as already noted; one was 
a decision distinctly not on the merits (Colegrove v. Green); and 
the third involved interpretation of an act of Congress (Wood v. 
Broom161). Now that the Court has decided in Baker that questions 
such as those presented in South v. Peters are justiciable and 
should be decided on the merits, those cases should come to the 
Court unembarrassed by the uncertainties of South v. Peters. 
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION AND REAPPORTIONMENT 
The thesis has been offered previously that the modern, liber-
tarian interpretation of equal protection when fundamental human 
rights are involved should prove adequate to the task yet to be 
accomplished of defining the standards by which equal protection 
is to be applied to reapportionment. The forum for testing this 
question is, and will continue to be, as the Supreme Court in-
tended, in state and lower federal courts; and considerable wis-
dom emerges from their separate encounters with the almost in-
finite variety of individual apportionment formulas. 
A. The Impermissible Classifications 
There can no longer be doubt that equal protection is some-
times to be read with the imperatives of an absolute, altogether 
forbidding some grounds of classification. Race is, of course, the 
clearest example, and religion would presumably be another if 
the first amendment were not available to serve the same function 
directly of its o·wn force. The argument is strongly pressed that 
the weighting of votes by apportionment-induced inequities should 
also be categorically forbidden. It is a forceful argument, stem-
ming from the democratic premise of guaranteed equality in the 
exercise of the franchise. The hypothesis is certainly no less com-
pelling, and perhaps more so, in light of the representative char-
acter of the government prescribed by the American Constitution. 
The constant movement in American democracy has been away 
100 339 U.S. at 277. 
101 287 U.S. I, 8 (1932). 
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from the early restrictions on the right of suffrage. Qualifications 
on the right of franchise based on property ownership and on sex 
have disappeared, as has the original practice of indirect election 
of Senators, and as have most other impediments to free exercise 
of the ballot. The nearly complete triumph of the democratic ideal 
in these respects is scarcely flawed save by persistent, and worsen-
ing, disadvantages imposed on some groups of voters occasioned 
solely by the fact of residence at one place within a state rather than 
another.162 
The democratic equalitarian argument against voter classifica-
tion other than on the basis of population is extremely attractive 
and has gained considerable support under the banner of "one 
man-one vote."163 Supporters of the principle of representation in 
accordance with population make it clear that they intend applica-
tion of that standard to both houses of every bicameral state legis-
lature, 164 but would ordinarily allow some flexibility where precise 
mathematical equality is not feasible except at the expense of other 
distortion, such as gerrymandering.165 Conceptually appealing 
as this position is, it is striking that at least in this absolute form 
it has attracted almost no judicial support. None of the Supreme 
Court opinions in Baker endorsed the proposition that all weight-
ing is forbidden. Although the majority opinion does not deal 
explicitly with the question, the concurring and dissenting opin-
ions demonstrate that the problem of standards had been much 
thought about. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, came closest to 
the "one man-one vote" proposition when he said that "the ques-
tion is, may a State weight the vote of one county or one district 
more heavily than it weights the vote in another?"166 As phrased, 
a negative answer might have been anticipated. However, invoking 
the test of "invidious discrimination," he continued: "Universal 
equality is not the test; there is room for weighting."167 Mr. Justice 
Clark was equally explicit in stating that "no one . . . contends 
162 It is no answ·er to suggest that the voter discrimination among state districts is 
similar to that against voters of different states in voting for senators. Reasons will be 
advanced infra for the proposition that the so-called "federal analogy" is in reality not 
relevant at all. 
163 Under that title, The Twentieth Century Fund in 1962 published a statement of 
the consensus of a conference of political scientists, research scholars, and others with 
particular experience and interest in apportionment. The te."t was prepared by Mr. 
Anthony Lewis, who served as reporter. 
164 See statement referred to in note 163 supra, at 8-12. 
165 See Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The 
Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 Mica. L. R.Ev. 107, 114-24 (1962). 
166 369 U.S. at 244. 
167 Id. at 244-45. 
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that mathematical equality among voters is required by the Equal 
Protection Clause."168 Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, rejected 
the concept of absolute, or even approximate, equality.169 And of 
course Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in their dissenting opin-
ions, denied that the equal protection clause carries such a com-
mand. Indeed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserted that the Court 
"shrinks from asserting that in districting at least substantial 
equality is a constitutional requirement enforceable by courts."170 
While he probably underestimated the consensus of the majority 
toward remedial action in cases of severe disparity, certainly no 
voice has yet been heard on the Supreme Court in favor of full 
equality of population in all state voting districts. 
In state and lower federal courts the answer has not been dif-
ferent on this point, even though very substantial reordering of 
state legislative apportionment was effectuated before the N ovem-
ber 1962 general election, the first after the decision in Baker. 
By the end of 1962 reapportionment in both houses of a bicameral 
legislature in accordance with population had been ordered by 
state or federal courts in five states; but in no one of them did the 
court rule categorically that mathematical equality of population 
was required for each election district (even permitting minor 
variations as a practical matter). 
The decision which looks most strongly in the direction of 
near-mathematical equality in both houses is Scholle v. Hare,171 
in which the majority of the Michigan Supreme Court held invalid 
provisions of the 1952 amendments to the state constitution creat-
ing senatorial voting districts that were "arbitrary, discriminatory, 
and without reasonable or just relation or relevance to the elec-
toral process."172 Justice Kavanagh, for himself and Justice Black, 
suggested a rule in these terms: 
"When a legislative apportionment provides districts having 
more than double the population of others, the constitutional 
range of discretion is violated. This is not to say that less than 
such 2 to I ratio is constitutionally good. It is to say only 
that peril ends and disaster occurs when that line is crossed."173 
108 Id. at 258. 
100 Id. at 265-66. 
170 Id. at 268-69. 
171 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), petition for certiorari filed sub nom. Beadle 
v. Scholle, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517). 
172 Id. at 186, 116 N.W.2d at 354. 
173 Id. at 188-89, 116 N.W.2d at 355. 
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In the same case, without suggesting possible limits of permissible 
variation, Justice Souris, for himself and Justice Smith, made a 
strong plea for population-based election districts: 
"Beyond the objective of affording to citizens effective repre-
sentation in the legislature, it is difficult for me to conceive 
of any other legitimate State purpose for classification of citi-
zens in their participation in the electoral process, a process 
inherently the equal right of each individual citizen."174 
The latter formulation is weakened, not only by the fact that the 
statement was made for only two of the seven participating justices, 
but as well since stated in general terms; and Justice Souris him-
self admits the possibility, however unlikely, that there might be 
"other legitimate objectives of classification which would consti-
tutionally justify State denial of the Citizen's right to a free and 
undiluted ballot . . . ."175 Justice Kavanagh, on the other hand, 
proposed a specific enough formula, but also spoke for only two 
justices. In addition, although his remarks have been widely 
quoted both by supporters and detractors of the equal-population 
principle, too little notice has been given to the fact that the princi-
ple was drawn from earlier Michigan cases176 dealing primarily 
with state constitutional questions, and from a dissenting opinion 
in the United States Supreme Court.177 No member of the Michi-
gan Supreme Court held invalid the provisions of the 1908 state 
constitution which would become operative on invalidation of the 
1952 amendments. But those provisions178 forbid division of coun-
ties in fixing the senatorial districts except where a single county 
is entitled on the basis of population to two or more senators. 
Under such restrictions only the most approximate equality would 
be possible, probably not even within the two-to-one limits man-
dated by Justice Kavanagh. 
Moreover, the statements quoted above from the majority 
opinion in Scholle v. Hare may be no more than strong dictum. 
The case was apparently decided on the ground that the long 
failure of effective reapportionment in the state senate had de-
174 Id. at 243, 116 N.W.2d at 381. 
175 Id. at 243, 116 N.W.2d at 381-82. 
176 Williams v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich. 447, 108 N.W. 749 (1906); Giddings 
v. Secretary of State, 93 Mich. I, 52 N.W. 944 (1892). 
177 In MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 288 (1948), Justices Douglas, Black, and 
Murphy, in dissenting, stated: "None would deny that a state law giving some citizens 
twice the vote of other citizens in either the primary or general election would lack the 
equality which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees." 
178 MICH. CONST. art. 5, §§ 2, 4. 
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prived the constitutionally prescribed districts of all rationality, 
as was the situation in Baker, a matter discussed later.179 The 
Michigan case can be described as a general endorsement of the 
equal-population principle, but probably not as an explicit holding 
to that effect. 
However far the decision in the Michigan case may be thought 
to go in support of the equal-population principle, courts which 
sweepingly invalidated existing apportionments in other states 
gave more modest reasons for their action. In Baker v. Carr, the 
defendants conceded before the three-judge district court on re-
mand of the case that the still-controlling 1901 act (the legislature 
having failed to reapportion in the meanwhile) "fell far short of 
the standards of the equal protection clause."180 The court had 
for decision then only the validity of the reapportionment statute 
enacted at the extraordinary session of the legislature convened 
in 1962. But the court was critical of the new plan for both houses, 
particularly the proposal for the senate which was characterized as 
"inexplicable either in terms of geography or demography.''181 
The total lack of rationality was demonstrated in that "not only 
are there wide discrepancies between rural areas of comparable 
character but disparities also exist as between urban areas."182 
In short, the Tennessee plan remained a "crazy quilt" without 
rational foundation, void under even the most undemanding stand-
ard of equal protection. However, a "rational" plan, even one per-
mitting unequal representation, was not forbidden: "We find no 
basis for holding that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes a 
state from enforcing a policy which would give a measure of pro-
tection and recognition to its less populous governmental units."183 
In the Virginia case, Mann v. Davis,184 the three-judge court 
concluded that implementation of the 1962 apportionment act 
should be enjoined as to both houses of the General Assembly. 
170 See also Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, pp. 8-14, Beadle v. Scholle, 
31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517). 
180 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 345 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). 
181 Id. at 347. 
1s2 Ibid. 
183 Id. at 346. 
184 Civil No. 2604, E.D. Va., Nov. 28, 1962. The injunction against proceeding under 
the 1962 acts was stayed until January 31, 1963, to permit convening the legislature or 
appeal to the Supreme Court. This action was further stayed by Mr. Chief Justice Warren 
on December 15, 1962, presumably on the ground that the legislature should not be 
required to act prematurely, without an opportunity for defendant state officials to be 
heard before the Supreme Court. Appeal was filed with the Supreme Court on Feb. 2, 
1963. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3284 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1963) (No. 797). 
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Yet the possibility of legislative consideration of other factors was 
acknowledged. 
"While predominant, population is not in our opinion the 
sole or definitive measure of districts when taken by the Equal 
Protection Clause. Compactness and contiguity of the terri-
tory, community of interests of the people, observance of 
natural lines, and conformity to historical divisions, such as 
county lines, for example, are all to be noticed in assaying the 
justness of the apportionment."185 
Three-judge courts in Alabama186 and Oklahoma187 invalidated 
apportionments in both houses of each state, but without squarely 
holding in either case that the equal-population principle must 
be satisfied in both houses. In the Alabama case, Sims v. Frink, 
the court suggested only that "representation according to popula-
tion to some extent must be required in both Houses if invidious 
discrimination in the legislative systems as a whole is to be 
avoided."188 But the cryptic words "to some extent" were not 
defined. In the Oklahoma case, Moss v. Burkhart, the court con-
cluded that unconstitutionality could not be demonstrated "by 
merely showing a disparity in voting strength of the various elec-
toral districts,"189 although "a disparity of ten to one in the voting 
strength between electoral districts makes out a prima fade case 
for invidious discrimination, and calls for strict justification."100 
As will more particularly appear below, other courts have 
rejected, in varying degrees, the equal-population principle as a 
necessary postulate in both houses. Some have said that repre-
sentation in at least one house must be closely related to popula-
tion, 101 while others have suggested that population is but one fac-
tor-albeit primary-of several that may permissibly be taken into 
account,192 and a few have concluded that the legislature is largely 
185 Id. at 10. 
186 Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962). 
187 Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962). 
188 208 F. Supp. at 439. 
189 207 F. Supp. at 891. 
190 Ibid. 
191 See Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. 
Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962); Mary-
land Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (per curiam), 
explanation of per curiam order, 184 A.2d 715 (1962); Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 
N.W.2d 350 (1962). 
192 See Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471, 476, 478 (D. Colo. 1962) (semble) 
[cf. In the Matter of Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962)); Sobel v. 
Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316, 321-22 (S.D. Fla. 1962); W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 
368, 374-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296, 301 (R.I. 1962); Baker v. Carr, 
206 F. Supp. 341, 349 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). 
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free to select whatever factors it chooses in the composition of 
election districts, so long as they are "rational."193 A number of 
courts, regardless of their views on standards, have retained juris-
diction pending anticipated legislative action, meanwhile offering 
cautious advice as to what might be disapproved and, still more 
tentatively, even as to what might be approved.194 
B. "Crazy-Quilt" Inequality 
In the absence of some guidance from the Supreme Court 
as to appropriate standards in relation to state legislative appor-
tionment, it should scarcely be expected that a state or lower 
federal court would unhesitatingly demand compliance with a 
relatively rigid equal-population principle to be made applicable 
at once in both houses of a state legislature that has historically 
operated from a different base. The law simply does not develop 
new areas so boldly, but moves more tentatively and exploringly, 
endeavoring meanwhile to insure community acceptance of the 
law's seeming demands. Such has been the experience following 
Baker v. Carr. As revealed in the preceding subsection, courts 
confronted with apportionment problems have uniformly accepted 
jurisdiction and acknowledged the obligation of decision. In 
some cases decision was easy because gross malapportionment was 
apparent or perhaps not even denied. But more often the courts 
retained jurisdiction pending opportunity for corrective action 
without necessity of judicial intervention. The cautious prodding 
of legislative action by the Vermont Supreme Court is representa-
tive: "The legislative branch has, as yet, failed to act. So long as 
time remains for performance, we cannot presume that once their 
duty has been called to their attention they will fail to carry it 
out."195 However, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court warned, "if 
the legislature neglects or refuses to make a fair, equitable and 
constitutional apportionment within a reasonable time after the 
1963 legislature has been in session, then plaintiffs or others should 
193 Caesar v. Williams, 371 P.2d 241 (Idaho 1962) (one senator for each county and 
at least one representative for each county); Levitt v. Maynard, 104 N.H. 243, 182 A.2d 897 
(1962); Levitt v. Attorney General, 104 N.H. 100, 179 A.2d 286 (1962). 
104 In the Matter of Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962); Sincock 
v. Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205, motion to dismiss denied, 210 F. Supp. 395, 396 (D. Del. 1962); 
League of Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962); Lein v. Sathre, 205 
F. Supp. 536 (D.N.D. 1962); Mikell v. Rousseau, 183 A.2d 817 (Vt. 1962); Wisconsin v. 
Zimmerman, 205 F. Supp. 673, dismissed without prejudice, 209 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Wis. 
1962). 
19G Mikell v. Rousseau, supra note 194, at 823. 
688 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
not be prejudiced or prevented, by the decision in this case, from 
appealing to a federal court for redress."196 
The truth is, and it is not unsurprising, that without explicit 
Supreme Court guidance the courts to which these matters have 
been presented have acted promptly and with considerable bold-
ness to eliminate some of the most virulent forms of malapportion-
ment. The easiest cases have been those, like Baker itself, in which 
the apportionments were "crazy quilts" without benefit of any 
defensible plan, rational or otherwise. Mr. Justice Clark demon-
strated effectively that, no matter how the apportionment in that 
case was examined, inequities appeared on the basis of any com-
parison that could be made.197 Not only were urban areas in 
general disadvantaged, but as well there were sharp inequalities 
even among rural counties of similar population and among urban 
counties of nearly equal size. The reason is not hard to find. Take 
an unequal apportionment fixed by statute in 1901, as was the 
case in Tennessee, quadruple the voting population over sixty 
years, and tilt the population balance from rural to urban while 
leaving the apportionment unchanged. Perhaps worst of all, the 
resulting malapportionment cements control of the very processes 
of change in the hands of those who have most to lose-often 
their very political life-from any change. It is hardly surprising 
that the courts should intervene to protect the integrity of the 
political process. 
This is, of course, exactly what has happened. Courts troubled 
by the apparent rigidities of the equal-population principle have 
often used as a more convenient handle the kind of gross disparities 
described above, continually compounded by population shifts, 
and often uncorrectible unless by judicial action. By the time 
Baker came back to the three-judge district court on remand, the 
defendants had conceded the invalidity of the 1901 statute, and 
the legislature had enacted new laws. But the court concluded that 
the "crazy quilt" inequities were still present and so in effect sent 
the matter back once more for legislative correction, meanwhile 
retaining jurisdiction.198 Similar aggravations to worsen malap-
portionment occur in a number of other states where legislative 
districts are prescribed by state constitution without provision for 
change with population shifts, and where state legislatures have 
failed to reapportion, often in violation of state constitutional obli-
196 Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183, 188 (W.D. Wis. 1962). 
197 369 U.S. at 253-64. 
198 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 349-51 (M:.D. Tenn. 1962). 
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gation. These are the clearest, and perhaps the most devastatingly 
dangerous, forms of malapportionment. Even where there might 
once have been a rational-even an equal-population-basis for 
apportionment, but which has been outdated by population 
shifts, no semblance of rationality remains. Invocation of the equal 
protection clause as a corrective in at least these cases, and they 
are numerous, 199 is an imperative hard to refuse. If Baker v. Carr 
should at last come to no more than a righting of these egregious 
·wrongs, it would have served well. The prospects are, however, 
that it will mean more, that the equal protection ideal will prove 
hardy enough to strike down further apportionment excesses, as 
suggested subsequently. 
C. The Equal-Population Principle and the "Federal Analogy" 
The applicability of the equal protection clause to the totally 
irrational inequities described above is apparent. Another con-
sequence of Baker, perhaps less obvious, is the near unanimity with 
which courts have concluded that population must be the sole, 
or at least the strongly dominant, factor in fixing election districts 
in at least one house of a bicameral state legislature.200 This devel-
opment is greatly significant both as a practical matter and from a 
conceptual standpoint. 
If the proposition gains general acceptance, as apparently it 
has, that equal protection requires that the election districts for 
at least one house of a bicameral legislature be fixed in accordance 
with the equal-population principle, adjustment will be necessary 
(or has already been made) in the dozen or more states in which 
before 1962 neither house of the legislature was apportioned on a 
predominantly population base.201 In response to litigation ini-
100 Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 
316 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962) [for later history, 
see note 158 supra]; Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 167, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962); League of 
Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 
885 (\V.D. Okla. 1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962); Mikell v. Rousseau, 
183 A.2d 817 (Vt. 1962); Mann v. Davis, Civil No. 2604, E.D. Va., Nov. 28, 1962; Wisconsin 
v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Wis. 1962). 
200 Sims v. Frink, supra note 199 (both houses); Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 
(D. Colo. 1962); Sincock v. Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205 (D. Del. 1962) (semble); Sobel v. Adams, 
supra note 199; Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248, 257 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Maryland 
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 184 A.2d 715, 718-21 (Md. 1962); Scholle v. 
Hare, supra note 199 (both houses); League of Municipalities v. Marsh, supra note 199 
(unicameral); Moss v. Burkhart, supra note 199 (both houses); Sweeney v. Notte, supra 
note 199; Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 349 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); Mikell v. Rousseau, 
supra note 199; Mann v. Davis, supra note 199 (both houses); Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 
supra note 199 (semble). 
201 Bow, PATIERNS OF APPORTIONMENT 3 (National Municipal League pamphlet 1962); 
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tiated in state and lower federal courts after the decision in Baker, 
several state legislatures began the corrective process in 1962, 
and others will act in 1963, including several in which courts re-
tained jurisdiction over suits alleging invalid standards until legis-
lative correction could be sought.202 
An important aspect of the developing consensus in favor of 
apportioning at least one house on a strict population basis is 
the remarkable fact that state and lower federal courts could so 
soon reach agreement on this minimum requirement of equal 
protection, an agreement reached despite absence of any Supreme 
Court guidance on the subject. Even as a preliminary decision, 
however, the matter is not free of difficulty. It is one thing to 
say that the democratic-equalitarian aspirations voiced by the equal 
protection clause necessitate a strict population formula in one 
house. But it is quite another thing to justify what some courts 
have accepted as a corollary proposition, that population need not 
be a factor at all in the second house. For a few it has been sufficient 
to cite the so-called "federal analogy" and say, as did Mr. Justice 
Harlan, dissenting in Baker: 
"It is surely beyond argument that those who have the re-
sponsibility for devising a system of representation may per-
missibly consider that factors other than bare numbers should 
be taken into account. The existence of the United States 
Senate is proof enough of that."203 
But the answer is not that simple. The claimed analogy between 
the representation formula in Congress and in the states does not 
withstand analysis, whether examined from the standpoint of 
history, constitutional command, or logic.204 
Thomas Jefferson, ·writing in 1816, stated with characteristic 
eloquence the democratic ideal of fairness in political representa-
tion when he said: "For let it be agreed that a government is 
republican in proportion as every member composing it has his 
Goldberg, The Statistics of Reapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 90, 91 app. A (1962). See also 
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM ON LEGISLATIVE .APPORTIONMENT (1962). 
202 Changes in apportionment to provide additional weight to population were 
effected by legislative act in 1962 in the following states: Alabama, Delaware, Florida 
(later invalidated), Georgia (later invalidated), Maryland (house only), Mississippi (but 
voted down), Tennessee (later invalidated), Vermont, and "Wisconsin (governor vetoed). 
Rh}'ne, The Death Knell of Minority Government 3 (mimeographed speech delivered 
at New York University, Nov. 17, 1962). 
203 369 U.S. at 333. 
204 For a more complete analysis, see McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT AND THE FEDERAL 
ANALOGY (National Municipal League pamphlet 1962). 
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equal voice in the direction of its concerns ... by representatives 
chosen by himself .... "205 In so speaking he was emphasizing 
anew the equalitarian principle that had been emphatically as-
serted in the Declaration of Independence and at the Constitu-
tional Convention in 1787. Although in the Constitution itself 
the principle of equal representation was rejected in the Senate, 
it is important to realize the reasons for that result. Indeed, the 
principle of representation proportional to population in both 
houses won out in the original voting in the Constitutional Con-
vention, when the Virginia Plan was under consideration.206 Soon 
enough, however, it became obvious that the smaller states would 
demand a larger voice in the Congress than population alone 
would justify. It was clear that if any government acceptable to 
a large enough number of states was to be agreed upon, a dif-
ferent formula must be worked out for at least one house. And 
so was born the "Great Compromise"207 whereby population would 
be the primary factor in the apportionment of representatives in 
the House, while population should be entirely disregarded in the 
allocation of two Senators to each state. 
Whether the final solution was less desirable than the earlier 
proposal by which population would have determined representa-
tion in both houses is not here the point. The political situation 
in 1787, particularly the tenuous authority of the Constitutional 
Convention even to propose a wholly new Constitution, made it 
clear that no change from the Articles of Confederation could be 
effected without the concurrence of all, or substantially all, of the 
sovereign states. The most important factor to be weighed in 
effecting a compromise ultimately acceptable to all was of course 
the fact that the existing states were all conceived to be sovereign 
and independent. Nor did the proposed Constitution contemplate 
any change in the retained sovereignty (soon to be further assured 
by the tenth amendment). Rather it was a consensual union of 
sovereign states by which they agreed to relinquish to the national 
government only those enumerated powers thought essential to 
the successful functioning of a national government, but reserving 
all powers not given over. And of course there was no power ex-
ternal to the Constitution itself which could on any basis be urged 
as requiring adoption of the equal-population principle in both 
houses of Congress. 
205 Letter to Samuel Kercheval, 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 38 (Ford ed. 1899). 
Sec also letter to John Taylor, id. at 29, 31; letter to Baron von Humboldt, id. at 89. 
206 FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 74-75 (1913). 
201 Id. at 105. 
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Individual states, in devising their own legislative structures, 
are very differently situated. Where the national government was 
founded by the states and was thus their creature, the relationship 
between the states and their political subdivisions is exactly the 
opposite. The local governmental units, the counties, cities, towns, 
and villages, were created by or under the authority of the state in 
which located. In the absence of any claim of sovereignty, such 
local units can be enlarged, reduced, or even eliminated at the 
almost uncontrolled discretion of the parent state. Congress of 
course has no such freedom to alter state boundaries. Typical, if 
somewhat too sweeping, generalization of the extent of state power 
over local governmental units is the Court's statement in Hunter 
v. City of Pittsburgh:208 "The number, nature and duration of 
the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory 
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion 
of the state." Even the unstated exception to the Court's all-
embracing assertion is instructive. The freedom to rearrange 
political subdivisions does not extend to cases in which the state 
legislative action intrudes upon specific constitutional prohibitions 
such as that in the fifteenth amendment against depriving a citizen 
of his vote because of race.209 Similarly, it is perfectly plain that 
the fourteenth amendment's proscriptions, to the extent relevant, 
are equally applicable as limitations on state action. Accordingly, 
once it is made clear that state legislative apportionment is to be 
tested against the standard of equal protection, there can be no 
claim of analogy in the congressional system of apportionment, 
prescribed as it is by the Constitution itself as part of a reluctant 
but necessary compromise. 
D. The Equal-Population Principle and the Second House 
in State Legislatures 
Unfortunately, rejection of the "federal analogy" does not 
solve all the problems that arise in seeking to apply the equal-
population principle to state legislative apportionment. An alterna-
tive formula must still be sought within the logical confines of 
the idea of equality in political representation. Conceptually, 
much the neatest solution would be to conclude that if equal 
protection requires equality of representation in one house of a 
bicameral legislature, it should also require equality of representa-
2os 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
209 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
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tion in the other house. There is more to be said in support of such 
a conclusion than the neatly logical, but sometimes barren, rule 
of symmetry. If dilution of the vote is the mischief at which equal 
protection is aimed, there is considerable force in an argument 
that the vote should not be diluted or weighted in either branch 
of a legislature. And so the question becomes one of determining 
whether legislative apportionment is comparable to racial segrega-
tion, in which the command of the equal protection clause is ab-
solute in forbidding classification altogether. The initial, but 
overwhelming, answer of the state and lower federal courts rejects 
the notion that classification is altogether forbidden.210 Moreover, 
it should be remembered that, no matter how attractive in the 
abstract may be the notion of absolute population equality in both 
houses of a state legislature, there is little, if any, indication that 
the Supreme Court will accept that absolutist standard.211 How-
ever, alternative solutions, attempting to reconcile a requirement 
of strict application of the equal-population principle in one house 
with a more permissive application of population standards in the 
second house, have for the most part been mere statements of re-
sult, devoid of articulated reasons. It is important, therefore, to 
determine whether reasons exist to support results that are in 
fact being reached. 
One proposition at least seems logically supportable. Even 
when the equal-population principle is satisfied in one house, 
population cannot be altogether disregarded in the other house. 
To permit a state to choose an apportionment formula in the 
second house entirely without regard to population would allow 
frustration of the equal-population principle in the other house. 
The state could, for example, so redispose the meaningful aspects 
of legislative power that the population-based house would be 
stripped of any significant share in the decisional process while 
the non-population-based house would be left in effective control. 
Surely equal protection is not thus to be ousted of meaning. That 
being the case, it appears to follow that population must to some 
extent be a factor in both houses. Solicitor General Archibald Cox 
emphasized this point when he predicted in the summer of 1962: 
"[I]t would not surprise me greatly if the Supreme Court 
were ultimately to hold that if seats in one branch of the 
legislature are apportioned in direct ratio to population, the 
210 See text at notes 171-94 supra. 
211 See text at notes 166-70 supra. 
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allocation of seats in the upper branch may recognize histor-
ical, political and geographical subdivisions provided that 
the departure from equal representation in proportion to 
the population is not too extreme."212 
Like the courts and other commentators, the Solicitor General 
provided no answer to the critical questions: Why must population 
be taken into account at all in the second house if it has already 
been employed as the sole factor in the other house and, conversely, 
what is the justification under the equal protection clause for 
allowing any significant departure from the equal-population prin-
ciple? Then, too, what sense can be made of permitti~g departure 
from equal representation in proportion to population if "not 
too extreme"? 
A reason has already been suggested for requiring that popula-
tion be significantly employed in fixing representation in both 
houses, so that the equal-population principle in one house not be 
frustrated by manipulation designed to deprive that house of any 
real role in the legislative process. Conceding, then, the relevance 
of population in both houses, the question remains as to why popu-
lation should be less than the sole factor in both and how much 
deviation from the population norm should be tolerated as "not 
too extreme." It is suggested here that the latter half of the ques-
tion, the defining of "not too extreme," can await the event of 
experience in decided cases once the principle is accepted that 
under the equal protection clause some departure from the equal-
population principle is in fact justifiable. 
Answer to the basic question demands inquiry into the nature 
of the equal protection command. If, as already suggested,213 the 
clause should be read as a vindicator of political democracy in a 
representative government, then the essential end to be served is 
an assurance that each person will have, as nearly as may be, 
an equal opportunity to share in the political process through 
which the persons charged with the legislative function are chosen. 
If equal protection requires that persons similarly situated be 
similarly treated, does it follow that all qualified voters within a 
state are similarly situated and must therefore be treated exactly 
alike?214 An affirmative answer, requiring full application of the 
212 Cox, Current Constitutional Issues, 48 A.B.A.J. 711, 712 (1962). 
213 See text at notes 205-09 supra. 
214 The term "qualified voter" itself suggests a classificatory scheme by which deter-
mination is made of eligibility to vote. There is no intention here to cast doubt on the 
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equal-population principle in every legislative body, readily sug-
gests itself; but on reflection that answer appears almost too facile. 
That which deserves protection is the right of every citizen to 
exert his full measure of influence in state elections. The question 
cannot be avoided as to whether that full measure of representation 
is still possible even if the equal-population principle is departed 
from in one house to a limited extent. 
The answer is here suggested that some kinds of limited devia-
tions should not be forbidden by the equal protection clause so 
long as it can be shown that they do not interfere with full and 
equal participation in the democratic electoral process. It becomes 
necessary then to determine what factors, if any, satisfy such a test. 
E. Factors Justifying Some Deviation From the Equal-
Population Principle 
The factors which have been advanced as a basis for disregard-
ing, in whole or in part, the command of representation in accord-
ance with population, include the following: geography, history, 
political unit lines, and even the amount of direct taxes paid. 
First, it should be observed, as by now must be evident, that none 
of these, alone or in combination, should be deemed acceptable as 
an alternative to representation in accordance with population. 
Thus, the only question is which of these, if any, might be em-
ployed in one house only to supplement a formula calling for 
primary reliance on the equal-population principle. Even so 
viewed, however, most of the commonly accepted standards appear 
defective when measured against the suggested constitutional test. 
1. Geography as a factor has been favorably considered in the 
New York case, W. M. C. A., Inc. v. Simon,215 where the court sug-
gested that it was not irrational for a state to deny representation in 
strict accordance with population to districts including more than 
half the population, but comprising only three percent of the land 
area of the state. On that basis the court justified substantial depar-
tures from population of nearly two to one in the New York 
senate and in excess of six to one in the assembly.216 The dissenters 
power of the state to impose reasonable restrictions on the right of franchise based on 
age, residence, ability to read and write the English language, or even the payment of a 
poll tax. See, e.g., Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), upholding the exaction of a 
poll tax, and exemptions of women, the aged, and minors. See also Williams v. Mississippi, 
170 U.S. 213 (1898). The proposed twenty-fourth amendment, if ratified by three-fourths 
of the states, would outlaw the poll tax. 
215 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
210 Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement, p. 7, W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 
3132 (U.S. Sept 26, 1962) (No. 460). Over the nation as a whole it is estimated that 70% 
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in Scholle v. Hare211 made a similar point in denying that voters 
from Detroit should be entitled to the same representation on a 
population basis as that accorded to voters from rural areas. Even 
conceding that it may be rational-in the sense of understandable 
-for a state legislature to weight representation on the basis of 
area considerations, it seems much more doubtful that this could 
satisfy the demands of equal protection. If the right protected by 
the clause is the right of individuals, as is assuredly the case, it 
seems not permissible to measure-and restrict-the right of fran-
chise in terms of factors not related to the individual. The hap-
penstance of residence on a farm, in a small community, or a large 
city should be irrelevant in determining the value of the franchise. 
Neither acres, nor trees, nor cows are entitled to vote, and their 
owners should not be favored in the legislative councils because of 
the fact of ownership. Geography as such does not merit protection 
from outlawry by the equal protection clause. 
2. The amount of direct taxes paid is a factor only in the New 
Hampshire senate, but one which the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court has upheld as not irrational and not forbidden by the equal 
protection clause.218 Apparently, justification is found in the con-
clusion that in one house of the legislature the landed interests 
should be permitted weighted representation, presumably in order 
to fend off any ill-considered legislation that might otherwise be 
adopted by landless voters. The fact that in the particular case no 
serious imbalance in urban-rural representation has resulted is not 
the point. This is of course not the way of democracy. Here, 
perhaps even more clearly than in the case of utilizing geography as 
a factor, the amount of direct taxes paid should not be permitted 
as a partial, let alone an exclusive, determinant of the proportion 
of representation to which a district might be entitled. 
3. For similar reasons there does not appear to be justification 
for special recognition in weighted votes to economic or ethnic 
interests. Neither labor nor management, neither dairy farming 
of the people now live on about 1 % of the land. Schattschneider, Urbanization and Re-
apportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 7 (1962). 
217 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350, 357, 358 (1962). It is interesting to note that the 
apportionment formula suggested by the Michigan Constitutionai Convention in the 
proposed new state constitution would, in the senate, accord population a factor of four 
and area a factor of one (art. IV, § 2). Under this formula, Keweenaw County, with 
2,417 people and 27,500 acres of inland water and 348,200 acres of land, would have 
a representation equivalent to 22,141 people. Tyler, What Is Representative Government?, 
The New Republic, July 16, 1962, pp. 15, 16. 
218 Levitt v. Maynard, 182 A.2d 897 (N.H. 1962). Interestingly enough, the three 
largest cities are slightly over-represented. Id. at 898. 
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nor shipping, neither racial nor religious minorities should be 
entitled as such to a weighted voice in the legislative forum. To do 
so is to tilt the democratic process dangerously and impermissibly. 
"If the State has the power arbitrarily to enhance the voting power 
of one group, it has equal power to repress the same group or any 
other."219 
4. History without more scarcely seems deserving of recognition 
as a factor permitting distortion of voter representation away from 
the norm of equality. The equal protection clause should be read 
in the present tense, as the Court observed in Brown v. Board of 
Education when it refused to "turn the clock back .... "220 The 
fact that a legislature has historically disregarded or minimized 
the element of population in fixing its legislative apportionment 
can scarcely mean that when inequities are revealed, they should 
be allowed to persist without change. The only way in which 
history might be thought to play a more acceptable part would be 
to say tl1at what is meant by an appeal to history is a plea for 
recognition of some special significance in long-established and 
traditional local governmental divisions such as the counties and 
towns. History in the sense of established governmental patterns 
speaks with a different and more rational voice, as will be noted 
later. 
5. Political subdivisions, counties or towns in most instances, 
are a part of the history and of the modern political apparatus of 
every state. In nearly all states representation in one or both houses 
of the state legislature is affected to some extent by the existence 
of these local units of government. Modern malapportionment is 
often attributable to the fact of continuing adherence to these 
units as a basis for representation, without adjustment for inter-
vening population changes that make original units anachronistic 
in the modern political world. In Connecticut, for example, when 
towns were originally selected as the basis for representation, with 
some adjustments among them to reflect population differentials, 
no one predicted the ultimate differences in rate of growth that 
would give Union with 383 inhabitants the same number of 
representatives as Hartford with its 162,178 inhabitants.221 Such 
examples of changing population leading to ever-worsening mal-
apportionment are of course repeated in nearly all states. Striking 
210 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 18-19, Gray v. Sanders, 31 U.S.L. 
WEEK 3012 (U.S. May 11, 1962) (No. 112). 
2'.:W 347 U.S. at 492. 
221 BoYD, op. cit. supra note 201, at IO. 
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examples from various regions of the country would include Cali-
fornia, where a vote in the smallest senate district is worth 422 
times a vote in Los Angeles County;222 Georgia, where the county-
unit system gave six state electoral votes to Fulton County with 
more than half a million population and two electoral votes to 
Echols County with a population of less than two thousand;223 
and Rhode Island, which permits horizontal and vertical inequities 
by giving each city or town one representative plus one additional 
member for every 25,000 population, resulting in differentials of 
more than four to one.224 
It is easy to multiply examples of severe malapportionment 
attributable to state legislative districting done in accordance with 
county and township lines. The problem is to determine whether 
some or all of the apportionments based on political unit lines 
should be deemed vulnerable to challenge on equal protection 
grounds. Supporters of the "one man-one vote" ideal would pre-
sumably reject any standard which takes into account factors ex-
traneous to population. That it is not possible to preserve intact 
the equal-population principle when consideration is given to 
representation by governmental units is readily understandable. 
The ways in which political units are fitted into state apportion-
ments are varied, but ordinarily include one or both of the follow-
ing principles, each of which involves more or less substantial 
departures from representation in accordance with population. 
(a) Each county (or town) may be authorized to elect at least 
one senator (or representative). In the eight legislative bodies in 
which, before Baker, equal representation was granted to each unit 
regardless of population,225 the distortion is at its maximum since 
population counts for nothing. The views here suggested would 
require invalidation of such formulas. Much more common, how-
ever, is a requirement that each county or town be entitled to 
one representative and that additional representatives be allotted 
on the basis of population up to the full number of seats in the 
legislature. While such a formula can never satisfy fully the equal-
population principle, it can provide at least rough approximations 
if two conditions are met: (1) If the number of seats in the legis-
lative branch is several times larger than the number of political 
222 Id. at 15. 
223 Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 160 (N.D. Ga. 1962) [for later history, see note 
158 supra]. 
224 Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296, 301 (R.I. 1962). 
225 BoYD, op. cit. supra note 201, at 3. 
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units entitled to one representative each, the chance for popula-
tion to play a dominant role is good. But if the number of counties 
to be represented approaches the number of legislators to be 
elected, the population principle is necessarily submerged.226 
(2) If the population spread from the least populous to the most 
populous county is not large, the opportunity for adjustment to 
approximate population standards is increased. But where the 
population spread is great, as is the case in states with one or more 
large population centers (which means nearly all states), popula-
tion cannot be adequately represented short of a legislative body 
of many hundreds of members. The inescapable conclusion is that 
continued provision for at least one representative from each local 
political unit is nearly always inconsistent with the equal-popula-
tion principle. Other formulas should be preferred. 
(b) States often provide that no county (or town) can be divided 
in fixing election districts except where such a unit is entitled to 
more than one representative. In recognition of the practical 
difficulties and inequities of assuring individual representation to 
every county, provision is thus allowed for the joining of two or 
more thinly populated counties to make a single election district. 
This permits considerable progress toward equalization among the 
various election districts. But the provision against division of 
counties makes complete equality unlikely; and the practicalities 
make its realization impossible. After all, counties scattered about 
a state cannot be joined into a single election district to effect 
equality with mathematical nicety. Even in the absence of a pro-
vision for compact election districts, common sense would dictate 
that they must at least be contiguous. 
Despite the difficulties suggested above, this proposition should 
not necessarily be thought to violate equal protection. The Michi-
gan Supreme Court, for example, might well approve such a plan 
in Michigan if none of the resulting representation ratios exceeded 
two to one.227 There is, moreover, considerable affirmative justifica-
tion for allowing this much latitude to accommodate permitted 
differences in state political structures. In varying degrees the states 
220 See, e.g., the Florida house of representatives, composed of 135 members to be 
elected from sixty-seven counties ranging in population from 2,868 (Gilchrist) to 935,047 
(Dade). Through 1962, Dade County was allotted three representatives and Gilchrist 
County one representative. For discussion of this and of amendments proposed in 1962 
(later defeated), see Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962). The 125 Kansas 
representatives are elected from 105 counties. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM 
ON U:GISLATIVE APPORTIONME..'<T (Kansas) (1962). 
227 See text at notes 171-79 supra. 
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have committed to their counties and towns some or many of the 
elements of governmental power. As a consequence many of the 
general and special acts of state legislatures directly affect the local 
governmental units, the counties, cities, towns, and villages.228 
The provision against division of counties in the creation of elec-
tion districts is one way of recognizing the need for such units to 
have at least a voice in the legislature. That it need not prepon-
derate unduly can be assured by provision for adding counties 
together for the choice of a single legislator (and by the equal 
protection clause). Whether the system of state and local govern-
ments reflected in these provisions is wise or unwise, efficient or 
inefficient, is not the issue. Unless the states are to be denied the 
right to choose forms of local government believed suitable to 
their separate exigencies, these governmental units should not be 
rendered totally impotent in the only forums in which they can be 
effectively heard-the state legislatures. Equal protection of per-
sons seems not unduly muted if modest accommodation is per-
mitted in one house of a state legislature for representation of these 
local government interests, always of course assuming that popula-
tion remains the strongly dominant factor. 
V. THE AVAILABLE REMEDIES 
Baker v. Carr has been widely thought to contain two mys-
teries, one the question of judicially manageable standards, and 
the other the question of remedies traditionally available to the 
judiciary. If, as suggested earlier, the standards under the equal 
protection clause are not so elusive as some have feared, the ques-
tion of remedies at once becomes more ponderable. Upon removal 
of the fear and uncertainty of unknown standards for decision, 
solution of the more limited problem of implementation becomes 
less difficult. Moreover, as already observed in another context, 
the most striking fact about the Baker decision is the enthusiastic 
reception it received and the rush to implement it. Mr. Justice 
Brennan, speaking for the Court in words that must have been 
carefully weighed, offered calm assurance that the problem of 
remedies will not prove insurmountable. He said: 
"Beyond noting that we have no cause at this stage to doubt 
the District Court will be able to fashion relief if violations 
of constitutional right are found, it is improper now to con-
22s See the discussion of this point in Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316, 321-22 (S.D. 
Fla. 1962). 
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sider what remedy would be most appropriate if appellants 
prevail at the trial."229 
In making this confident prediction Mr. Justice Brennan may 
well have had in mind the very substantial number of cases before 
Baker in which both state and federal courts had taken jurisdic-
tion of various apportionment disputes and, through one device 
or another, had effected workable solutions.230 Indeed, the Su-
preme Court itself has not hesitated, once jurisdiction was agreed 
upon and the existing apportionment was found defective, to 
suggest the election at large of congressional representatives. 
Smiley v. H olm,231 decided by a unanimous Court in 1932, was 
just such a case. Minnesota's governor had vetoed a bill creating 
new congressional districts after the state delegation had been 
reduced pursuant to the 1930 census. The legislature, denying the 
governor's right of participation, declared the new districts ef-
fective despite the veto. When the Minnesota courts denied relief 
at the suit of a qualified voter and taxpayer against the secretary 
of state, the United States Supreme Court reversed; the injunc-
tion was issued; and the election was held at large.232 
Concern about the adequacy of judicial remedies to correct 
state malapportionment appears to consist in part of fears lest 
the judiciary overreach its proper function either in dealing with 
its co-equal branches of government or in dealing with other 
sovereign components of a federal structure. In part the concern 
seems also to issue from awareness of the powerless position of 
the judiciary and consequent worry that potential disregard of 
the judicial command would damage irreparably public confi-
dence in the judicial institution as a voice of ultimate authority. 
Answer to both aspects of this concern about the potential futility 
of judicial intervention is found in the wealth of cases decided 
before Baker in which that danger did not materialize, and in the 
emerging pattern of cases decided since Baker which suggest a 
similarly happy augury for the future. 
220 369 U.S. at 198. 
230 For an instructive review, see Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal 
Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1066-70, 1087-90 (1958). For a post-Baker review of similar 
materials, see Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and 
Its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 673, 699-702 (1962). 
231 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
232 77 CONG. REC. 71 (1933). In two cases decided the same day, the Court reached 
the same result, with the effect of requiring election at large of Missouri's thirteen 
representatives [Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932)], and of two New York representa-
tives [Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932)]. 
702 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
Legislative reaction to judicial condemnations of state and 
congressional apportionments should be vastly encouraging to 
those who fear for the respect in which American courts, state 
and federal, are held. Despite judicial lack of power over "purse 
and sword," no instance of legislative defiance of judicial pro-
nouncement has been discovered in the area of apportionment. 
Courts have of course proceeded cautiously and no more rapidly 
or drastically than seemed inescapably necessary. But it is remark-
able in how many instances, even before Baker, legislatures re-
sponded to judicial determination of the invalidity of an appor-
tionment scheme, even without remedial implementation.233 The 
same technique has been employed with similar success in the 
state and lower federal courts since Baker.234 Certainly, there is 
nothing novel in a federal court's refusal to approve matters com-
mitted to its review without specifying what action must be taken 
to satisfy constitutional or legislative command. Sufficient example 
is found in the review of federal administrative action by which 
the Court simply explains the legal error and remands to the 
agency for further action.235 If any complaint is to be made of the 
usefulness of the in-effect reference back to the state legislature 
for appropriate action, it can only be that the lower courts and 
legislatures alike have so far been handicapped by their inability 
to know for certain what would be the ultimate standard adopted 
in definition of equal protection. As this matter is resolved, the 
reference-back technique should prove fully sufficient in nearly 
all cases. 
Encouraging though it is to be able to predict that nearly all 
233 See Magraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901 (D. Minn. 1958); Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 
138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956); Shaw v. Adkins, 202 Ark. 856, 153 S.W.2d 415 (1941); 
Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Colo. 425, 37 P.2d 757 (1934); Moran v. Bowley, 347 Ill. 148, 179 
N.E. 526 (1932); Brooks v. State, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904); Denney v. State, 144 
Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929 (1896); Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836, rehearing denied, 
133 Ind. 212, 33 N.E. 119 (1892); Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W.2d 315 (1931); 
Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W. 865 (1907); Merrill v. Mitchell, 257 Mass. 
184, 153 N.E. 562 (1926); Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 225 Mass. 
55, 113 N.E. 740 (1916); Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 224 
Mass. 598, 113 N.E. 581 (1916); Williams v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich. 447, 108 N.W. 
749 (1906); Board of Supervisors v. Blacker, 92 Mich. 638, 52 N.W. 951 (1892); Giddings 
v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892); State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 
433, 146 S.W. 40 (1912); Rogers v. Morgan, 127 Neb. 456, 256 N.W. I (1934): Asbury 
Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960); In re Sherill, 188 N.Y. 185, 
81 N.E. 124 (1907); People ex rel. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. 
827 (1893); Jones v. Freeman, 193 Okla. 554, 146 P.2d 564 (1943); State ex rel. Lamb v. 
Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35 (1892); State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 
724 (1892). See also Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932); Annot., 2 A.L.R. 
1337 (1919). 
234 See notes 194, 202 supra. 
235 See also Lewis, supra note 230, at 1087. 
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apportionment cases can thus be handled smoothly without raising 
the troublesome questions of potential court-legislature conflict, 
still the problems of those harder cases, however few, must be 
faced up to. Indeed, one of the principal reasons for which the 
reference-back technique has ordinarily proved successful is that 
courts have customarily stated their willingness to act if legisla-
tures do not; and, significantly, courts have retained jurisdiction 
pending such action. It has also been common practice to fix a 
period of time within which the legislature must act on pain of 
having the matter reopened before the courts. 
A. Redistricting by the Court 
The spectre most commonly raised by those who fear judicial 
impotence to devise and enforce remedies is that of a court ac-
tually redrawing the election district lines itself. But that is 
exactly what Mr. Justice Clark favored as at least a temporary ex-
pedient in Baker,236 a suggestion similar to one which had been 
advanced to the Court in the amicus brief for the United States 
in that case.237 Although the majority of the Court did not act on 
the suggestion, and the three-judge court on remand also found 
it unnecessary because of concession of the invalidity of the Ten-
nessee apportionment,238 the possibility remains. 
One court, confronted with new legislation that failed to 
eliminate the complained-of malapportionment, put together a 
new plan and ordered it into effect for the general election in 
November 1962. And the sky did not fall. This occurred in the 
Alabama case, Sims v. Frink,239 in which the three-judge district 
court studied portions of various legislative proposals, accepting 
the best and rejecting the worst features, and thus arrived at a 
concededly temporary and imperfect plan. The court stated: "The 
duty to reapportion rests on the Legislature. This Court acts in the 
matter reluctantly because of the long-continued default and total 
inability of the Legislature to reapportion itself."240 
B. Injunctions 
A recurring pattern in cases following Baker has been to seek 
injunctive relief against various state officials connected with the 
electoral process to restrain them from conducting a forthcoming 
236 369 U.S. at 253-64. 
237 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rcargumcnt, pp. 74-78. 
238 206 F. Supp. 341, 345 (\V.D. Tenn. 1962). 
230 208 F. Supp. 431 (M:.D. Ala. 1962). 
!!40 Id. at 441. Sec also Fortner v. Barnett, No. 59965, Ch. Ct. of First Judicial Dist. 
of Hinds County, Miss., reported in Appendix infra. 
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primary or general election absent correction of alleged uncon-
stitutionally ordained election districts. Ordinarily the courts have 
avoided an injunction, usually by the device of according to the 
legislature an opportunity for corrective action. However, in the 
Georgia county unit case, Sanders v. Gray,241 an injunction was 
issued to restrain state election officials from using that system 
where it fell short of a standard already stated by the court.242 
C. Mandamus 
Perhaps the most drastic remedy, and the one least likely to 
be used with any frequency, is the ·writ of mandamus. There are 
special difficulties in the use of mandamus against a legislature 
that make it unlikely that it will serve any important function in 
apportionment cases;243 but the possibility of utilizing such a 
remedy is not foreclosed.244 Interestingly enough, in the Rhode 
Island case, Sweeney v. Notte,245 the state supreme court doubted 
its authority to supervise reapportionment in the state legislature 
because it "would be in the nature of mandamus by duress."246 
But it offered the opinion that if the legislature failed to act within 
a reasonable time, a federal court, presumably not restricted as 
would be a state court by the respect between two co-equal 
241 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962) [for later history, see note 158 supra]. In Mann 
v. Davis, Civil No. 2604, E.D. Va., Nov. 28, 1962, the court issued an injunction against 
conducting elections on the basis of the existing apportionment, but stayed its effective 
date until January 31, 1963, to permit legislative consideration. This in tum was stayed 
by Mr. Chief Justice Warren on December 15, 1962. See note 184 supra. See also Scholle 
v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), in which on July 17, 1962, Mr. Justice 
Stewart stayed the mandatory injunction issued in that case. 
242 "[A] unit system for use in a party primary is invidiously discriminatory if any 
unit has less than its share to the nearest whole number proportionate to population, 
or to the whole of the vote in a recent party gubernatorial primary, or to the whole vote 
for electors of the party in a recent presidential election; provided no discrimination is 
deemed to be invidious under the system if the disparity against any county is not in 
excess of the disparity that exists against any state in the most recent electoral college 
allocation, or under the equal proportions formula for representation of the several 
states in the Congress, and provided it is adjusted to accord with changes in the basis 
at least once each ten years. This is a 'judicially manageable standard' contemplated 
in Baker v. Carr." 203 F. Supp. at 170. 
The suggested standard has been criticized for being rigidly mathematical and for its 
unfortunate link with the hard-to-predict vagaries of the electoral college. Dixon, Legisla-
tive Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 329, 373.75 
(1962); Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUPREME COURT REv. 252, 
318-19. Appropriately, the Supreme Court rejected this standard as too narrowly restric-
tive, instead emphasizing in this context (statewide primary elections) that the principle 
of "one person, one vote" should control. Gray v. Sanders, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4285, 4288 
(U.S. March 18, 1963). 
243 See Friedelbaum, supra note 230, at 699. 
244 Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S-. 565 (1918). 
246 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962). 
246 Id. at 303. 
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branches of government, would probably reapportion or order 
the legislature to do so. 
D. Ordering Election at Large 
Few if any legislators relish the physical and financial hard-
ships, as well as the increased uncertainties, involved in a state-
wide election at large. Accordingly, the fear of a judicial order 
for an at-large election has in the past proved an effective prod 
to induce an otherwise reluctant legislature to make essential ap-
portionment changes.247 Judicial intimation of such an order is 
particularly likely to be effective in inducing legislative action, in 
view of the fact that elections at large of members of congressional 
delegations have in fact resulted from Supreme Court decisions,248 
lower federal court decisions,249 and from state court decisions.250 
The fact that this fairly drastic remedy was not immediately 
utilized by any court following Baker does not necessarily mean 
that it cannot be applied in the state reapportionment cases. But 
it is true that there are potentially significant differences between 
congressional and state districting in this respect. Whether a fed-
eral court could successfully impose an at-large election upon a 
state whose election laws do not contemplate such may raise dif-
ficulties which the federal courts will prefer to avoid;251 and there 
may be hazards surrounding the always doubtful area of de jure 
and de facto legislative authority.252 But perhaps these problems 
are too special and certainly do not apply everywhere. Serious 
consideration should be given to the further use of the at-large 
election device. 
CONCLUSION 
Baker v. Carr marks the full maturation of the libertarian 
aspects of the equal protection clause and provides the courts, 
federal and state alike, with an opportunity to vindicate as a consti-
tutionally protected right the assurance to all persons of an oppor-
tunity to full and equal participation in the principal rite of the 
democratic process, the exercise of the franchise. As state legisla-
tures become more fully responsive to the electorate whom they 
serve there should be renewed opportunity for the states to 
247 See Lewis, supra note 230, at 1088-89; see also cases cited in note 233 supra. 
248 Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Smiley 
v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
240 Hume v. Mahan, I F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Ky. 1932). 
2r:;o Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932). 
'!!til See Friedelbaum, supra note 230, at 700. 
252 For a thoughtful analysis of state cases predating Baker, see Note, 15 RUTGERS 
L. REY. 82, 86-90 (1960). See also Neal, supra note 242, at .!103-04, 306-08. 
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demonstrate the wisdom of reserving to the states those powers not 
committed to the national government.253 The plea of states' rights 
can become again the dignified and meaningful claim to separate 
sovereign rights and obligations that it should always have been, 
rather than the strident and prideful cry it has sometimes seemed. 
253 "[T]here is a strong national interest in encouraging vigorous and responsible 
State and local government." House Comm. on Gov't Operations, Federal-State-Local 
Relations: Federal Grants-In-Aid, H.R. REP. No. 2533, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1958). See 
also THE EDITORS OF FORTUNE, THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 1 (1957); U.S. CoMM'N ON 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 3, 38, 40 (1955). 
APPENDIX 
A Summary of Significant Reapportionment Litigation Initiated During 1962 
Alabama 
Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245, temporary injunction continued, 208 F. Supp. 431 
(M.D. Ala. 1962), appeal pending sub nom. Reynolds v. Sims, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 
(U.S. Oct. 12, 1962) (No. 508). The court invalidated the apportionment of both houses 
which had been adopted by the legislature in July 1962, and drew up its own plan, 
adopting portions of various legislative proposals, for use in the 1962 elections, but 
cautioned the legislature to take further corrective action in 1963 or face additional court 
action. 
Alsup v. Mayhall, 208 F. Supp. 713 (S.D. Ala. !962). In a suit to restrain enforcement 
of a law providing for election of eight congressional candidates from nine former dis-
tricts (one seat having been lost as a result of apportionment after 1960 census), the 
court recognized the applicability of Baker v. Carr, but dismissed for lack of a showing of 
inequality. 
California 
Silver v. Jordan, Civil No. 62-953-MC, S.D. Cal. 1962. In an action seeking additional 
representation for Los Angeles County (but not full equality), the court denied a pre-
liminary injunction in August 1962. In September, a stipulation was entered by the 
parties that the action would be dismissed by plaintiff if California Initiative No. 23 
(to increase the Senate from forty to fifty, with the largest gain in new seats for Los 
Angeles County) should be approved November 6, 1962, while plaintiff could petition for 
a hearing on the merits if the initiative proposal should be defeated (which it was). 
Yorty v. Anderson, petition for writ of mandate in California Supreme Court filed 
December 28, 1962. Petitioners seek reapportionment of the state into forty senatorial 
districts "as nearly equal in population as may be," as required by § 6 of article IV of 
the constitution of 1879, and invalidation of subsequent amendments providing that no 
county shall contain more than one senatorial district. 
Colorado 
Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962). Although the court concluded 
that disparities shown made a prima facie case for correction, the case was held for 
hearing until after the November 6, 1962, election, at which a population plan for both 
houses was defeated and a so-called "federal" plan was approved. 
In the Matter of Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962). In an original 
proceeding in the Colorado Supreme Court for the issuance of a prerogative writ, the 
court retained jurisdiction until after the election described above, and indicated willing-
ness to act if necessary despite the problems contemplated. 
Connecticut 
Valenti v. Dempsey, Civil No. 9544, D. Conn. 1962. In a suit to attack apportionment 
of both houses of the Connecticut General Assembly, the court, on December 20, 1962, 
denied an application for a preliminary injunction to restrain state officials from con-
vening the 1963 assembly and to command them to reconvene the 1961 assembly to take 
action on the senate alone (allegedly only the 1961 assembly can reapportion on the basis 
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of 1960 census figures). The denial was based in part on the fact that plaintiff was from 
an over-represented senate district; but jurisdiction was retained over the entire proceeding. 
Delaware 
Sincock v. Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205 (D. Del. 1962). The court withheld action until 
August 7, 1962, pending legislative action. The legislature proposed a constitutional 
amendment, which would become effective in 1963, reapportioning the house on popula-
tion and the senate on geography. The court denied ,motions to dismiss and ordered 
trial on the constitutional provisions, including the proposed amendment. Sincock v. 
Terry, 210 F. Supp. 395, .396 (D. Del. 1962). 
Florida 
Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp • .316 (S.D. Fla. 1962). The court held existing reappor-
tionment laws invidiously discriminatory, as well as the first 1962 legislative attempt 
at correction. At a special session in August 1962, the legislature withdrew the earlier-
proposed amendment and offered another which the court indicated would be acceptable 
if approved by the voters on November 6, 1962. Jurisdiction was retained; the amend-
ment was defeated; and a further session of the legislature adjourned without agreeing 
on another proposal. 
Lund v. Mathas, 145 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962). This was a suit filed in Circuit Court for 
Volusia County, Florida, challenging the congressional districting within the state. On 
October 24, 1962, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the claim, holding Colegrove v. 
Green still controlling as to congressional districting. 
Georgia 
Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated and remanded, .31 U.S.L. 
WEEK 4285 (U.S. March 18, 1963). The lower court enjoined the use in primary elections 
of the so-called "county unit" plan (even as amended one day before judgment) in voting 
for statewide offices, and the Supreme Court remanded to the district court for a decree 
consistent with the principle of "one person, one vote." The Court avoided, however, 
any expression of opinion as to permissible deviations, if any, in legislative districting 
cases. 
Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962). Although refusing an injunction 
until the legislature could act, the court held the existing state legislative apportion-
ment invidious and ai:bitrary, and stated that at least one house of the General Assembly 
must reflect population. Thereafter the state senate was redistricted on a population basis. 
Wesberry v. Vandiver, 260 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962). Although the court cited 
Baker v. Carr in holding that it had jurisdiction over a suit challenging congressional 
districting, it also cited Colegrove v. Green in dismissing for want of equity and other 
reasons, including delicacy of the question and possibility of state or congressional legis-
lative remedy. Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle dissented, favoring retention of jurisdiction 
pending opportunity for legislative correction. 
Idaho 
Caesar v. Williams, .371 P.2d 241 (Idaho 1962). The Idaho Supreme Court, over two 
dissents, dismissed an action challenging state apportionment providing for one senator 
from each county and at least one representative from each county. 
Hearne v. Smylie, D. Idaho, filed Oct . .31, 1962. The action requests convening of a 
three-judge court to retain supervisory jurisdiction until the 1963 legislature has an 
opportunity to correct the alleged state legislative malapportionment. 
Indiana 
Stout v. Hendricks, Civil No. IP 61-C-2.36, S.D. Ind. 1962. Plaintiffs suggest various 
alternative forms of relief from alleged state legislative malapportionment, including 
injunctive relief to restrain operation of apportionment statutes, an election at large, 
or an election based on districts fixed by the court until the legislature acts to establish 
new districts. 
Grills v • .Anderson, Cause No. S 59-600, Super. Ct. of Marion County, Ind., 1962. The 
court denied a motion for summary injunction to restrain election of November 6, 1962, 
for members of the General Assembly. 
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Iowa 
Davis v. Synhorst, Civil No. 5-1289, S.D. Iowa 1962. In a suit challenging both the 
present state apportionment and that of a proposed constitutional amendment, the court, 
on October 20, 1962, denied defendants' motion to dismiss. 
Kansas 
Harris v. Shanahan, No. 90476, Dist Ct. of Shawnee County, Kan., 1962. Decision of 
the trial court that state legislative apportionment is repugnant to the due process clause 
was in effect stayed pending appeal to tlie Kansas Supreme Court. 
Kentucky 
Schmied v. Combs, Civil No. 4380, W.D. Ky. 1962. The suit challenges state legislative 
apportionment and seeks to compel the governor to call a special legislative session. 
Combs v. Matthews, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2395 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1963), holding that 
redistricting of the lower house to include more than two counties in a single district 
is not barred by the state constitution. 
Maryland 
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (per 
curiam), explanation of per curiam order, 184 A.2d 715 (1962), appeal pending, 31 U.S.L. 
WEEK 3173 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1962) (No. 554). Pursuant to court of appeals directions in April 
1962, a trial court found invidious discrimination in the composition of the House of Dele-
gates. Thereafter, at a special legislative session, nineteen delegates were added as a "stop-
gap" measure, and a proposed constitutional amendment was defeated. In a four-three 
decision, the court of appeals in September 1962 upheld the county-based apportionment 
formula in the senate. 
Michigan 
Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960), remanded, 369 U.S. 429, on remand, 
367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), petition for certiorari filed sub nom. Beadle v. 
Scholle, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517). The Michigan Supreme Court, 
on reconsideration in light of Baker v. Carr, as ordered by the United States Supreme 
Court, held, four to three, that both houses must be apportioned in relation to popula-
tion and that the senate apportionment was on that basis invalid, requiring legislative 
reapportionment within thirty days or election of senate candidates at large on Novem-
ber 6, 1962. On July 17, 1962, Mr. Justice Stewart granted a stay of that order. 
Minnesota 
Minnesota ex rel. LaRose v. Tahash, 115 N.W .2d 687 (Minn. 1962). The Minnesota 
Supreme Court upheld validity of a statute prohibiting operation of motor vehicles 
without the owner's permission, even though the statute had been enacted after changes 
in population resulting in claimed inequality of representation following the last re• 
apportionment. 
Hedlund v. Hansen, Civil No. 4-62, No. 122, D. Minn. 1962. The action challenges 
apportionment as to the Board of County Commissioners of Hennepin County, Minnesota. 
Mississippi 
Fortner v. Barnett, No. 59965, Ch. Ct. of First Judicial Dist. of Hinds County, Miss., 
1962. The state trial court held the existing apportionment law invalid and prescribed the 
districts it would order into effect if the legislature did not act. The legislature there-
after reapportioned itself, but its proposal was defeated at the election of November 6, 
1962. 
Missouri 
Preisler v. Hearnes, No. 49370, decided by Missouri Supreme Court en bane on 
Dec. 11, 1962. The Court accepted Baker v. Carr as analogous, but rejected a challenge 
to congressional districting where the variation from smallest to largest districts was from 
378,486 to 506,854. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2304 (1962). 
Nebraska 
League of Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962). The court found 
substantial disparities among election districts, but refused to enjoin voting on a proposed 
constitutional amendment which would give areas some weight in apportionment, and 
denied other relief until after the 1963 legislative session. 
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Nevada 
Paley v. Sawyer, Civil No. 1593, D. Nev. 1962. The case attacks present state legis-
lative apportionment. 
New Hampshire 
Levitt v. Maynard, 104 N.H. 243, 182 A.2d 897 (N.H. 1962); Levitt v. Attorney General, 
Io-! N.H. 100, 179 A.2d 286 (N.H. 1962). The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld as 
rational the method of fixing state senatorial districts based on equalized valuation of 
direct taxes paid. 
New Jersey 
Jackman v. Bodine, Docket No. C-2293-61, Super. Ct. of N.J. (Cb.), Hudson County, 
1962. The suit challenges the existing apportionment in both houses of the New Jersey 
legislature and, in the absence of legislative remedy, requests an order limiting the value 
of the vote of senators and assemblymen on a weighted-ratio basis and for the holding 
of elections at large. 
New Mexico 
Cargo v. Mechem, filed in Dist. Ct., County of Santa Fe, N.M., 1962. The suit, 
challenging apportionment in the New Mexico house of representatives, asks that the 
governor be ordered to convene a special session of the legislature and that the conduct 
of the next general election in 1964 be enjoined unless correction is made. 
New York 
W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 741, remanded, 370 U.S. 190, on remand, 208 
F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), appeal pending, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3132 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1962) 
(No. 460). The district court, on remand for reconsideration in light of Baker v. Carr, 
rejected the challenge made to both houses of New York legislature, finding the existing 
apportionment rational. 
Honeywood v. Rockefeller, Civil No. 62-0423, E.D.N.Y., affd per curiam, 371 U.S. 1 
(1962). The district court denied the grant of a preliminary injunction before trial on 
a claim that state election officials had discriminatorily excluded Negroes from a newly 
proposed congressional district. 
Wright v. Rockefeller, Civil No. 62-2601, S.D.N.Y. 1962. On November 26, 1962, the 
court rejected a challenge to congressional districting in New York City, which had 
alleged that lines had been drawn to exclude non-white citizens and citizens of Puerto 
Rican origin from one district and to include them in three others. 
North Dakota 
Lein v. Sathre, 201 F. Supp. 535, later decision subsequent to state court action, 205 
F. Supp. 536 (D.N.D. 1962). The district court first deferred decision for the North 
Dakota Supreme Court to pass on the question. That court did so [113 N.W.2d 679 
(N.D. 1962)], holding the existing state apportionment invalid, but denied injunctive relief 
against the holding of 1962 general election without reapportionment. Thereafter, the 
federal district court, considering itself bound by the state court's further determination 
that the authority of the apportioning group within the house of representatives had 
expired, and having no reason to believe that the legislature would not act in 1963, 
declined relief, but retained jurisdiction until thirty days after the conclusion of the 
1963 legislative session. 
Ohio 
Nolan v. DiSalle, Civil No. 6082, S.D. Ohio 1962. The suit challenges the existing 
apportionment in the Ohio house of representatives. 
Sive v. Ellis, Civil No. 6491, S.D. Ohio 1962. Same as Nolan v. DiSalle, supra. 
Ohio ex rel. Scott v. Masterson, 173 Ohio St. 402, 183 N.E.2d 376 (1962). In an original 
mandamus proceeding the Ohio Supreme Court ordered the Cleveland City Council to 
comply with mandatory provisions of the city charter for periodic reapportionment of 
voting districts in the city. 
Oklahoma 
Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962). The court held the existing 
apportionment in both houses invalid, retaining jurisdiction until the 1963 legislature 
should have a chance to act, in accordance with a standard of "substantial numerical 
equality" in both houses. Meanwhile, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had refused to set 
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aside a 1961 apportionment because, although invalid under the state constitution, it 
was superior to the earlier act. Jones v. Winters, 369 P.2d 135 (Okla. 1961). On Novem-
ber 6, 1962, the voters approved a proposal for a three-man reapportionment commission. 
Pennsylvania 
Butcher v. Trimarchi, No. 2531, Equity Docket and No. 151, Commonwealth Docket; 
Seidman v. Trimarchi, No. 2532, Equity Docket and No. 153, Commonwealth Docket; 
Driscoll v. Trimarchi, No. 2533, Equity Docket and No. 154, Commonwealth Docket, 
C.P. Ct. of Dauphin County, Pa., 1962. The court, although accepting the relevance of 
Baker v. Carr for state court proceedings, refused to upset the election machinery for 
November 6, 1962, and therefore declined judgment on the pleadings, pending legislative 
action in the next session of the General Assembly. 
Rhode Island 
Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962). The Rhode Island Supreme Court con-
cluded that the existing state legislative apportionment was invalid, but declined to 
intervene because of the mandatory obligation of the General Assembly to act. The court 
predicted that if that body should fail to act within a reasonable time, a federal court, 
not bound by the state court's deference to a co-equal partner, would probably act. 
Tennessee 
Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), remanded, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), on 
remand, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). On remand from the United States Supreme 
Court the invalidity of the original apportionment was conceded, and the district court 
held invalid further legislative acts of 1962. Jurisdiction was retained until June 1963 
.to give the Tennessee legislature further opportunity to correct apportionment inequities. 
Vermont 
Mikell v. Rousseau, 183 A.2d 817 (Vt. 1962). The Vermont Supreme Court cautioned 
the legislature to act promptly to correct malapportionment. The legislature responded 
by enacting a one-year reapportionment plan for the state senate, providing in the 
meanwhile for a study of apportionment in both houses. 
Virginia 
Mann v. Davis, Civil No. 2604, E.D. Va., Nov. 28, 1962, appeal pending, 31 U.S.L 
WEEK 3284 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1963) (No. 797). The court held invalid existing apportionment 
in both houses of the Virginia General Assembly. The resulting injunction to restrain 
state officials from acting under these laws was stayed by the court until January 31, 1963, 
to permit legislative action or appeal to the Supreme Court. Mr. Chief Justice Warren 
granted a further stay on December 15, 1962. 
Washington 
Thigpen v. Meyers, Civil No. 5597, W.D. Wash., Dec. 13, 1962 (31 U.S.L. WEEK 2305). 
The court declined to interfere with congressional districting where the vote of a person 
in the least populous district is worth 1.5 times the vote of a person in the most populous 
district. The same court concluded that the existing state legislative apportionment was 
invidiously discriminatory and refused to decline jurisdiction because of the defeat of 
an initiative reapportionment measure at the election of November 6, 1962. The court 
retained jurisdiction pending opportunity for legislative correction in 1963. 
Wisconsin 
Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 205 F. Supp. 673, dismissed without prejudice, 209 F. Supp. 
183 (W.D. Wis. 1962). The court declined to enjoin conduct of the 1962 election on the 
basis of the existing apportionment (the legislature's further partial reapportionment had 
been vetoed by the governor). Believing the 1963 legislature should be given a reason-
able time for corrective action, the court dismissed without prejudice. 
Wyoming 
Wyoming ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, Civil Docket 53, No. 161, Appeal No. 3143, Wyo. 
Sup. Ct., 1962. The suit challenges existing state legislative apportionment, seeking man-
damus against the secretary of state. 
